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Collateral Children 
CONSEQUENCE AND ILLEGALITY AT THE 
INTERSECTION OF FOSTER CARE AND CHILD SUPPORT 
Daniel L. Hatcher† 
INTRODUCTION 
When children are removed from poor families and placed in 
foster care, federal law forces a collaboration between child welfare and 
child support agencies to pursue child support obligations against the 
children’s parents.1 But the children receive no benefit. Payments made 
in the name of child support are re-routed to the government coffers and 
converted into a funding stream to reimburse the government costs of 
providing foster care services.2  The cost recovery requirement targets 
parents who are the least able to pay, whose children were often removed 
due to the circumstances of poverty and the neglect that results.3  Saddled 
with the additional child support obligation, the parents’ struggles toward 
economic stability and family reunification are often derailed.4 Case 
plans required by federal law to aid reunification are illegally converted 
into debt-collection tools.5 If the parents fall behind, the government-
owed debt can become a consideration, sometimes the sole factor, for the 
  
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; J.D. 1996, University of Virginia 
School of Law. I would like to thank Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Michele Estrin Gilman, Martin 
Guggenheim, Caterina P. Hatcher, Michael I. Meyerson, Robert Rubinson, and Elizabeth J. Samuels 
for their many helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. This Article was supported by a 
summer research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law.  
 1 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17) (2000). 
 2 See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
OEI-04-91-00530, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN IN IV-E FOSTER CARE (1992) [hereinafter 1992 
OIG REPORT], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-91-00530.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 
27 (2002) (“Poverty—not the type or severity of maltreatment—is the single most important 
predictor of placement in foster care and the amount of time spent there.”); Naomi R. Cahn, 
Children’s Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1189, 1198 (1999) (describing the relationship between poverty and abuse and neglect); Martin 
Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem That Too Many 
Children Are Not Being Adopted out of Foster Care or That Too Many Children Are Entering Foster 
Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 145 (1999) (“[T]he link between child protection and poverty is 
staggering.”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Child Abuse, the Constitution, and the Legacy of Pierce 
v. Society of Sisters, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 479, 480 (2001) (“Too many children, especially 
children of color, are being removed from their homes because of poverty and its associated ills.”). 
 4 Eve A. Stotland, Resolving the Tension Between Child Support Enforcement and 
Family Reunification, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 317, 321-22 (2001). 
 5 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(B); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), (g)(4) (2007). 
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permanent seizure of their children through the process of terminating 
parental rights. Foster children become collateral, mortgaged to secure 
the debt for their own care.  
Foster care cost recovery through child support enforcement is 
initiated under the requirements of Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.6 
Federal foster care funding is available to state child welfare agencies 
when children are removed from low-income families and are thus “IV-E 
eligible.”7 To receive the federal funds, Title IV-E requires an inter-
agency partnership in an effort to generate government revenue 
equivalent to agency costs.8 Child support obligations are initiated 
against both mothers and fathers of foster children, and rather than using 
the payments for the children’s benefit, the child support is assigned to 
the government to reimburse the costs of care.9 For foster children 
removed from well-off families, no such federally required process 
exists.10  
This cost recovery process is a component of broad government 
efforts aimed at converting funds originally intended to benefit children 
into government revenue streams in order to reduce state spending on 
welfare and foster care services. The process mirrors welfare cost 
recovery policies that require parents applying for welfare assistance to 
initiate child support obligations against the noncustodial parents and 
assign resulting child support payments to the government.11 Likewise, in 
addition to pursuing child support payments, child welfare agencies also 
seek to recover costs by taking control of foster children’s Social 
Security benefits.12 Although the Social Security benefits are intended to 
  
 6 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 7 The specific IV-E eligibility requirements are more complicated than simply 
establishing the parents’ income, but the purpose of the federal funding is clearly limited to 
providing assistance for foster children who come from poor families that would have been eligible 
for welfare assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (explaining the congressional purpose of enabling states 
to provide foster care services to children who otherwise would have been eligible for AFDC 
welfare benefits); 42 U.S.C. § 672 (setting out the specific eligibility requirements for states to 
receive foster care maintenance payments under Title IV-E).  
 8 The federal statute requires that “where appropriate, all steps will be taken, including 
cooperative efforts with the State agencies administering the program funded under part A of this 
subchapter and plan approved under part D of this subchapter, to secure an assignment to the State of 
any rights to support on behalf of each child receiving foster care maintenance payments under this 
part.” 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 9 Id.  
 10 If a foster child is not eligible for IV-E payments, a state is not required by federal law 
to seek child support payments from the parents. However, even without the federal mandate, 
several states have established their own procedures that require parents of children in state-funded 
foster care to make child support payments in order to repay the state costs. See infra Part I.B. 
 11 See generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the 
Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hatcher, Child Support] (providing a critical analysis of the history and present practices 
of welfare cost recovery).  
 12 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1797, 1805-06 (2006) [hereinafter Hatcher, Foster Children] (discussing the legal and policy 
concerns of state agencies utilizing foster children’s Social Security benefits to reimburse state 
costs). 
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help children suffering from disabilities or who have deceased or 
disabled parents, the agencies apply to become the children’s 
representative payees and then re-direct the children’s funds into the state 
coffers.13  
Similar to the conflicts born out of these other cost recovery 
policies, the effort to recover foster care costs through child support 
enforcement diverts the child welfare agencies’ missions. The over-
arching purpose of the child welfare system is to protect the welfare of 
children while simultaneously striving to strengthen and preserve 
families.14 The child support program is guided by the best interests of 
the child standard.15 However, through the forced intersection of the two 
programs in order to recover costs, a gear-grinding shift occurs that 
subverts the agencies’ core missions to the cost recovery pursuit. The 
transposition of self-interested government financial interests over the 
agencies’ primary goals leaves the programs in conflict and the parents 
and children ill-served.  
Individual child welfare caseworkers often oppose the policy, 
expressing concern regarding parents’ inability to pay and the impact on 
case-planning goals.16 Enforcing government-owed child support 
obligations frequently poses a significant barrier to parents’ struggles to 
obtain economic stability and thus hampers the likelihood of family 
reunifications.17 Longer stays in foster care and weakened parent-child 
relationships often result, and the fiscal benefit to the government from 
the cost recovery efforts is uncertain. Because the parents of children in 
IV-E foster care are poor, child support payments are minimal, and the 
government’s administrative costs in pursuing the payments weigh 
against the resulting collections.18 
  
 13 Id.  
 14 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637, 
642 (2006) (“The mission of the child welfare system is to protect children believed to be abused or 
neglected by their families and to strengthen families where children are at risk for abuse and 
neglect.”); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 331, 340 (2002) (noting that “the role of the child welfare agency, whose primary 
mission is ‘to ensure the safety and well-being’ of children through the direct provision of 
assistance” (quoting New York City Administration for Children’s Services, Mission & 
Organization, http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about/mission.shtml (last visited May 22, 2009))); 
see also 45 C.F.R. § 1355.25(a) (2007) (“The safety and well-being of children and of all family 
members is paramount. When safety can be assured, strengthening and preserving families is seen as 
the best way to promote the healthy development of children.”). 
 15 Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1033, 1037, 1040.  
 16 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that foster care workers express concern 
that “families of IV-E Foster Care children are too poor to pay,” that “enforcing child support will be 
detrimental to the parent/child relationship” and “[t]hey do not believe that child support serves to 
stabilize the family unit and help insure its future integrity”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 17 Id.; see infra Part II.A; see also Jane C. Murphy, Protecting Children by Preserving 
Parenthood, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 969, 973 (2006) (concluding that the broader child 
welfare rules and policies “promote the loss of birthmothers in poor children’s lives, often with no 
long-term maternal substitute for affected children”). 
 18 See infra Part II.C.  
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Legal concerns follow the policy concerns: imposing 
government-owed child support obligations upon foster children’s 
parents often illegally conflicts with federal reunification and case-
planning requirements.19 Plans intended to help parents safely reunify 
with their children are transformed into debt collection tools that make 
reunification less likely.20 Impoverished parents are further impoverished, 
and if unable to keep up with the extra financial obligation, their children 
are not returned. And as the parents’ economic struggles and 
reunification efforts falter, an unconstitutional practice emerges— 
severing the parent-child relationship for a government-owed debt. 
Although the relationships are constitutionally protected,21 the parents’ 
substantive due process rights are overridden when cost recovery 
obligations are used as grounds to terminate parental rights.22 
For example, in North Carolina, an incarcerated father obtained 
an early release date through good behavior in the hopes of regaining 
custody of his young daughter.23 The child welfare agency developed 
plans for reunification,24 yet simultaneously sought to terminate parental 
rights because the father did not pay child support to reimburse the costs 
of foster care.25 Although no child support order was in place to give him 
knowledge of any obligation to pay, and his only income from laboring 
  
 19 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000) (requiring reasonable efforts to safely reunify 
families); id. § 675(1) (describing the case plan requirements).  
 20 See infra Part III.A.  
 21 See, e.g., Santoksy v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (recognizing the “fundamental 
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”). 
 22 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-18-7(b)(1) (1992 & Supp. 2008) (requiring court to consider 
as a factor the “[f]ailure by the parents to provide for the material needs of the child or to pay a 
reasonable portion of its support, where the parent is able to do so”); 13 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 
1103(a)(5) (1999 & Supp. 2008) (allowing the consideration of whether “respondent is not able or 
willing to assume promptly legal and physical custody of the child, and to pay for the child’s 
support, in accordance with the respondent’s financial means”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2269(c)(4) 
(2008) (requiring court to consider parent’s “failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of 
substitute physical care and maintenance based on ability to pay”); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 
(2004) (listing grounds for termination of parental rights [hereinafter “TPR”], including: “(4) 
Abandonment of the child by placing him in the physical custody of a nonparent, or the department, 
or by otherwise leaving him under circumstances demonstrating an intention to permanently avoid 
parental responsibility by any of the following: . . . (b) As of the time the petition is filed, the parent 
has failed to provide significant contributions to the child’s care and support for any period of six 
consecutive months”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(b)(3) (West 2007) (allowing TPR if “a parent 
has been ordered to contribute to the support of the child or financially aid in the child’s birth and 
has continuously failed to do so without good cause”); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.506(1) (2007) 
(allowing TPR if a parent has failed “to provide care or pay a reasonable portion of substitute 
physical care and maintenance if custody is lodged with others”); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(a)(1) 
(2003) (allowing TPR when a “parent has willfully neglected to provide proper care and 
maintenance [support] for the child for a period of at least one year where financially able to do so”); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1)(f) (Vernon 2008) (allowing TPR if the parent has “failed to 
support the child in accordance with the parent’s ability during a period of one year ending within 
six months of the date of the filing of the petition”).  
 23 In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2d 735, 742 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 24 Id. at 742. 
 25 Id. at 736.  
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in a prison kitchen was forty cents a day, the father lost his daughter for a 
government debt of $72.80.26  
The case exemplifies the extreme result when the child welfare 
system’s primary goals are subordinated to a focus on cost recovery, and 
unfortunately the case is not alone in its Dickensian approach.27 As cash-
strapped state agencies are directed to expand child support collection 
efforts in foster care cases,28 and face continued federal pressure to 
develop practices in order to quickly terminate parental rights,29 such 
examples of the child welfare agency’s diverted mission will likely 
continue.  
The legal crossroads of foster care and child support have been 
subject to very little scholarly exploration,30 yet the legal and policy 
issues surrounding this intersection pose significant concerns to foster 
children, parents, and society. Part I of this Article begins the exploration 
by describing the framework of foster care cost recovery through child 
support enforcement, and describes the poverty correlation impacting 
parents and children in the child welfare system.  Part II examines the 
impact on children, parents, and society when state agencies are 
sidetracked from serving children to pursue the fiscal goal of 
replenishing government revenue. Part III considers the several legal 
concerns that result. The Article concludes in Part IV by suggesting the 
elimination of the cost recovery practice, and includes suggested 
incremental reforms to begin ensuring that child welfare agencies are no 
longer diverted from serving child welfare goals.  
  
 26 The opinion first explains that the father earned between forty cents and one dollar per 
day, but the dissent indicates the relevant income during the statutory period was apparently limited 
to forty cents per day. While discussing the parent’s ability to pay during the statutory period, the 
dissent notes that “[a]fter his transfer . . . in May 2001, he was allowed to work in the kitchen at the 
tray window” and “he earned 40 cents a day or $2.80 a week.” Although no child support order was 
in place, if the father had been required to pay all of his earnings in child support, the maximum 
amount he could have paid during the statutory six-month period was $72.80 (forty cents per day 
multiplied by 182 days in the 6-month period). Id. at 737, 740.  
 27 See infra Part II.B.  
 28 See ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
ACYF-CB-IM-07-06, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM (2007) [hereinafter ACF INFO. MEMO.], 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/2007/im0706.htm 
(directing state agencies to increase collaboration between foster care and child support agencies to 
pursue child support against parents of foster children). 
 29 See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 683, 729-30, 777-78; id. at 727 n.188 (describing the requirements and impact 
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) and noting that “[e]very state has amended 
its abuse and neglect and termination of parental rights statutes to reflect ASFA’s Mandates to 
promote termination of parental rights and adoption”) (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO/HEHS-00-1, STATES’ EARLY EXPERIENCES IMPLEMENTING THE ADOPTION AND SAFE 
FAMILIES ACT 6 (1999)); Murphy, supra note 17, at 976 (describing a “shift from policies favoring 
reunification to policies encouraging quicker termination of parental (maternal) rights and 
adoption”). 
 30 Two articles published in the National Center on Poverty Law’s Clearinghouse Review 
consider policy concerns of seeking child support from the parents of foster children. See Nancy S. 
Erickson, Collection of Child Support Maintenance from “Custodial” Parents of Children in Foster 
Care: Is it “Appropriate?”, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 34 (1994); Stotland, supra note 4.   
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I.  FOSTER CARE COST RECOVERY THROUGH CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT 
The purpose of the forced partnership between child welfare and 
child support agencies is simple: reimbursement of the government costs 
of providing foster care services.  Likewise, the emotive reflex to the cost 
recovery pursuit is equally simple: parents that abuse and neglect their 
children should be legally responsible for the resulting foster care costs. 
However, the simplicity of the desire to hold the parents financially 
responsible yields to complex realities as the family circumstances are 
understood, the legal framework of the cost recovery practice is 
explored, and the funding and policy structures of the child welfare 
system are realized.  
A.  The Poverty Correlation 
Children in foster care are not likely to come from rich families. 
Rather, a strong link exists between poverty and child maltreatment.31 
The Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect found 
that children in families with annual incomes below $15,000 were 
twenty-two times more likely to experience some form of maltreatment 
than children whose families earned $30,000 or more per year.32 This 
poverty correlation doubles when considering only child neglect, and 
neglect is the most common type of maltreatment.33 Of all maltreated 
children, almost two-thirds (64.1%) of the children suffered from 
neglect, compared to 16 % of the children who were physically abused.34  
The parents of children suffering from maltreatment present 
harsh portrayals of the causes and effects of poverty: former welfare 
  
 31 See, e.g., Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective 
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2285, 2294-98 (1998); Cahn, supra note 3, at 1198; Dorothy E. Roberts, Is there Justice in 
Children’s Rights? The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 
125-26 (1999). 
 32 ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NAT’L INCIDENCE 
STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/statsinfo/ 
nis3.cfm. 
 33 Id. (explaining that children “in families with annual incomes below $15,000 per year 
were . . . more than 44 times more likely to be neglected” than children whose families with annual 
incomes of $30,000 or more); see also ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING: ONE YEAR IN 
FOSTER CARE: WAVE 1 DATA ANALYSIS REPORT 37, 42 (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/abuse_ 
neglect/nscaw/reports/nscaw_oyfc/oyfc_report.pdf (finding that the majority of children were placed 
in foster care due to neglect, with approximately half of the neglectful circumstances categorized as 
“failure to provide,” and that of the children placed in foster care due to neglect from the failure to 
provide, the primary reasons [accounting for over 90% of the failure to provide cases] were lack of 
adequate health care, food, or shelter). 
 34 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD 
MALTREATMENT 2006 ch. 3 (2008), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm06/chapter3.htm. 
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recipients fighting a losing battle for economic stability;35 victims of 
domestic violence;36 young parents who grew up in foster care repeating 
the cycle;37 parents struggling with substance abuse;38 homeless mothers 
unable to find shelter,39 and families lacking access to health care.40 State 
practices often treat such circumstances of poverty as grounds for child 
removal,41 and studies reveal that caseworker bias may increase the 
likelihood of removing a child from a low-income family.42 
The connection between poverty and foster care is further 
exacerbated by state and federal policies and by the overall funding 
structure of the child welfare system. To receive federal foster care 
funding, a state must obtain judicial determinations that the child welfare 
agency made “reasonable efforts” to prevent the necessity of child 
  
 35 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Making Poor Mothers Fungible: The Privatization 
of Foster Care, in Child Care and Inequality: Rethinking Carework for Children and Youth, in 
CHILD CARE & INEQUALITY: RETHINKING CAREWORK FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH 83, 96 (Francesca 
Cancian et al. eds., 2002) (“On one hand, we have the image of the middle class White mother, who 
can afford to donate her carework because her wage-earning husband supports her. On the other 
hand, we have the image of the poor Black or Brown welfare mother who must beg for handouts 
because she has neither a spouse nor a job in the wage economy. The first appears secure in her role 
as “mother”, whereas the second is fungible and constantly at risk of state intervention.”); see also 
Stotland, supra note 4, at 321 (explaining that child removal causes parents previously receiving 
welfare assistance to lose the benefit, increasing the economic difficulties).   
 36 See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy & Margaret J. Potthast, Domestic Violence, Substance 
Abuse, and Child Welfare: The Legal System’s Response, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 88, 90 
(1999); Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children: 
Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1110-11 (1995); Melissa A. Trepiccione, At 
the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect 
Her Child an Acceptable Solution When Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1487, 1489 (2001).  
 37 Clare Huntington, Mutual Dependency in Child Welfare, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1485, 1490 (2007) (“[T]he system is self-perpetuating. Research has begun to show the 
intergenerational cycle of foster care. Many parents of children in foster care today were once in 
foster care themselves.”). See generally JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: 
HOW TO BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1998).  
 38 E. Michelle Tupper, Children Lost in the Drug War: A Call for Drug Policy Reform to 
Address the Comprehensive Needs of Family, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 325, 336 (2005) 
(“Seven out of ten cases in the child welfare system are currently caused or worsened by substance 
abuse, but few court professionals have adequate training or understanding of addiction issues to 
address the situation appropriately.”).  
 39 Huntington, supra note 37, at 1491; NAN P. ROMAN & PHYLLIS WOLFE, NAT’L 
ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, WEB OF FAILURE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSTER CARE 
AND HOMELESSNESS 9 (1995), available at http://www.endhomelessness.org/content/article/detail/1285/ 
(follow “PDF” hyperlink). 
 40 NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, supra note 33, at 107 
(noting that of the caregivers from whom children were removed into foster care, “78% needed 
mental health services,” “90% needed Medicaid,” and 49% needed other health care services).  
 41 Cahn, supra note 3, at 1198-99. 
 42 See Emerich Thoma, If You Lived Here, You’d Be Home Now: The Business of Foster 
Care, The Confusion of Poverty with Neglect, 10 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS (1998), 
available at http://www.ipt-forensics.com/journal/volume10/j10_10_13.htm (discussing studies 
indicating caseworker bias); see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 975 (noting that “[m]any 
commentators have suggested . . . that intervention results, at least in part, from the child welfare 
system’s adherence to the traditional idealized definition of the ‘good mother’ rather than from 
thorough investigations and documentation of child abuse and neglect” (quoting Jane C. Murphy, 
Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal 
Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 689, 708-09 (1998))).  
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removal.43 The requirement seemingly requires that the needs of low-
income parents must be addressed before the drastic step of child 
removal is taken. But unfortunately, the “reasonable efforts” to provide 
needed services are usually inadequate.44 A survey of child welfare 
workers found that former caregivers whose children were taken into 
foster care were in critical need of services at the time of removal, 
services including domestic violence counseling, child care assistance, 
housing and income assistance, access to health care, mental health 
services, and substance abuse treatment.45 However, the needs of the 
caregivers were largely unmet.46 For example, 62% of caregivers needed 
domestic violence services compared to only 15% who had their need 
met, and 71% needed housing assistance, while only 14% received the 
needed aid.47 
The funding structure of the child welfare system also 
contributes to the problem. Title IV-B federal funding, made available to 
provide services to help struggling families stay intact, is capped.48 In 
contrast, Title IV-E funding provided to assist states with foster care 
costs after child removal is structured as an entitlement, and thus limited 
only by the number of eligible children.49 In 2004, “[m]ore than $5.8 
  
 43 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2000). 
 44 See Esme Noelle DeVault, Reasonable Efforts Not So Reasonable: The Termination of 
the Parental Rights of a Developmentally Disabled Mother, 10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 763, 
764-65 (2005) (describing the inadequacies of the reasonable efforts requirement); Deborah Paruch, 
The Orphaning of Underprivileged Children: America’s Failed Child Welfare Law & Policy, 8 J.L. 
& FAM. STUD. 119, 135-39 (2006) (describing problems with the reasonable efforts requirement, 
including that federal law fails to define the term and insufficient funding has been provided); 
Roberts, supra note 31, at 115 (“Family preservation efforts often fail because they are inadequate: 
children are returned to troubled homes without assessing parents’ problems or providing the level or 
continuity of services required to solve them.”); see also PEW COMMISSION ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY, PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER 
CARE 13-14 (2004), available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/docs/FinalReport.pdf (explaining 
that insufficient funds are made available for reunification efforts or preventing the need for foster 
care).  
 45 NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, supra note 33, at 107. 
(“Overall, child welfare workers indicated that 78% of caregivers needed income assistance, 70% 
needed employment services, 77% needed substance abuse services, 78% needed mental health 
services, 73% needed legal services; 62% needed domestic violence services; and 90% needed 
Medicaid. Housing services were needed by 71 % of caregivers and health care services were needed 
by 49% of the families . . . .”). 
 46 Id. at 108-13; see also Murphy, supra note 17, at 979 (“[L]ess than six out of ten 
children who are removed receive post-investigation services. Not only are services not provided 
through the narrowed ‘reasonable efforts’ requirement that remained under ASFA, poor families also 
experienced dramatic cutbacks in general public support throughout the post-ASFA period. The lack 
of services and strict timelines under ASFA has led to record numbers of mothers losing their status 
as parents through termination of parental rights.”). 
 47 NATIONAL SURVEY OF CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, supra note 33, at 
108-13. 
 48 See CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF 
PROTECTING VULNERABLE CHILDREN V: UNDERSTANDING STATE VARIATION IN CHILD WELFARE 
FINANCING 14 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311314_vulnerable_children.pdf 
(explaining that Title IV-E provides “open-ended entitlements” whereas Title IV-B benefits are 
capped). 
 49 Id.  
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billion in title IV-E funds” were made available to states, compared to 
$693 million in Title IV-B funds.50 Further, in addition to the funding 
discrepancy, Title IV-E payments are targeted so that states have a 
financial preference to remove foster children from poor families. States 
are only eligible to receive the IV-E funds on behalf of children removed 
from families that would have been eligible for welfare assistance.51 
Private consultants are often hired to develop strategies to increase the 
“penetration rate”—the percentage of foster children who come from 
poor families and are thus eligible for the IV-E funds.52 Children in low-
income families, already at greatly increased risk of being assessed for 
child maltreatment due to the circumstances of poverty, are further 
targeted because they are viewed as coming with money attached. 
B.  Legal Framework 
Title IV-E of the Social Security Act,53 the federal law that 
provides the largest federal funding source for state foster care 
programs,54 requires enforcing child support obligations against the 
parents of foster children. When children are removed from low-income 
families and are thus “IV-E eligible,”55 the child welfare and child 
support agencies must work together in order to pursue child support 
obligations against the parents.56  A process for referring foster care cases 
for child support enforcement services is required, and support 
obligations are then initiated against the parents.57 Any resulting 
payments are assigned to the government in order to reimburse the costs 
of foster care.58  
  
 50 Id. at 15, 20. 
 51 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (2000). 
 52 Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, at 1821; Susan Vivian Mangold, Poor 
Enough to be Eligible? Child Abuse, Neglect and the Poverty Requirement, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
575, 598 (2007).  
 53 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17).  
 54 See SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 48, at 14 (“Title IV-E, the largest funding stream, 
consists of the Foster Care and Adoption Assistance Programs, which are open-ended entitlements; 
the Chafee Foster Care Independence Program, which is a capped entitlement; and a non-entitlement 
funding authorization for education and training vouchers to youth who have aged out of foster 
care.”). 
 55 The specific IV-E eligibility requirements are more complicated than simply 
establishing the parents’ income, but the purpose of the federal funding is clearly limited to 
providing assistance for foster children who come from poor families that would have been eligible 
for welfare assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 670 (explaining the congressional purpose of enabling states 
to provide foster care services to children who otherwise would have been eligible for AFDC 
welfare benefits); id. § 672 (setting out the specific eligibility requirements for states to receive 
foster care maintenance payments under Title IV-E).  
 56 Id. § 671(a)(17). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id.  
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1. One Piece of the Cost Recovery Puzzle 
Child support enforcement in foster care cases is part of a 
broader government focus on recovering the costs of assistance provided 
to low-income families and children; an effort that places the fiscal 
concerns of government agencies over the interests of those served.59 The 
strategy of reimbursing foster care costs through child support occurs 
both within a more expansive, formalized framework of welfare cost 
recovery through the child support program and alongside an ad-hoc 
approach of state agencies to reimburse foster care costs by taking 
control of foster children’s Social Security benefits.  
First, similar to child support requirements in the foster care 
program, child support obligations are enforced against noncustodial 
parents to repay the costs of cash welfare assistance.60 When custodial 
parents apply for welfare assistance through the Temporary Aid to Needy 
Families program (TANF), the parents must cooperate in pursuing child 
support obligations against the noncustodial parents and simultaneously 
agree to assign the rights to receive the payments to the government.61 
These welfare cost recovery policies evolved from the historical federal 
intervention in child support that culminated in 1975, with the creation of 
the federal and state partnership under Title IV-D of the Social Security 
Act.62 From its outset, the IV-D child support program was used in part 
to provide child support payments to families, but the primary purpose of 
the program’s creation was to recover the costs of government 
assistance.63   
In addition to the dual efforts to recover both foster care and 
welfare costs through child support enforcement, another foster care cost 
recovery method targets foster children’s Social Security benefits.64 
Children may be eligible to receive Social Security benefits because they 
are either disabled or have deceased or disabled parents.65 Although not 
intended as a state funding source, child welfare agencies have 
developed procedures to access the children’s funds.66 The agencies 
  
 59 Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, at 1807.  
 60 See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1044-48; Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images 
of Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 325, 345 (2005).  
 61 42 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(2)-(3), 654(29). 
 62 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, §§ 451-460, 88 Stat. 2337, 
2351-58 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660). 
 63 See, e.g., HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
318 (1981); Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1041-42; Murphy, supra note 60, at 344 
(noting that “the primary goal of modern child support law was to reduce welfare costs”).  
 64 See generally Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12.  
 65 A child with a disabled or deceased parent may be eligible to receive Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) under Title II of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 
401-34. Children who themselves are disabled may be eligible to receive Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) under Title XVI. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383f.  
 66 Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, at 1805-06. 
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screen children for possible eligibility for Social Security benefits, assist 
in the application process, and then take over management of the benefits 
by applying to become representative payees.67 Once in control of the 
funds, the agencies side-step their fiduciary obligations by using the 
children’s benefits to reimburse government costs rather than to support 
the children’s individualized needs.68   
The cost recovery methods described above often overlap. For 
example, a foster child’s mother may have received cash welfare 
assistance prior to her child’s placement in foster care, resulting in the 
collection of child support payments from the noncustodial father69 to 
repay the welfare agency costs and simultaneous child support collection 
efforts against both parents to repay the costs of foster care services.70 
Also, the same child may be eligible to receive Social Security benefits, 
which the child welfare agency will also pursue to reimburse costs.71 The 
result is a bureaucratic cost recovery puzzle that even many policy 
experts and practitioners do not attempt to solve. The next sections 
consider how foster care cost recovery through child support 
enforcement has come to form one of the ill-fitting pieces of the puzzle.  
2. Historical Structure 
Prior to Title IV-E, the federal aid program to states for foster 
care costs existed in Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, intertwined 
with the past Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare 
program.72 The initial child support requirements for the combined 
AFDC and foster care program were vague. Added as part of the Social 
Security Amendments of 1967, the amended state plan provisions 
required states to develop a child support program and pursue child 
support for children receiving either AFDC or foster care benefits but did 
not specifically require assignment of the resulting child support 
obligations to the government.73  
  
 67 Id.  
 68 Id. at 1806. 
 69 This Article occasionally refers to absent parents simply as the noncustodial or absent 
fathers because custodial parents in single parent households are usually the mothers. However, the 
Article certainly recognizes that the mothers may also be the absent parents. See LILIANA SOUSA & 
ELAINE SORENSEN, THE URBAN INST., NEW FEDERALISM: NAT’L SURVEY AM.’S FAMILIES, THE 
ECONOMIC REALITY OF NONRESIDENT MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2006) [hereinafter THE 
URBAN INST.], available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311342_B-69.pdf.  
 70 Id. at 6; see also Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, at 1807-08.  
 71 THE URBAN INST., supra note 69, at 5-6; see also Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 
12, at 1805-06.  
 72 The federal foster care aid, then titled “Payments to States for Foster Home Care of 
Dependent Children” was included under the AFDC benefit definition so that any reference to 
AFDC also included the foster care benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1970 ed.) (“[T]he term ‘aid to 
families with dependent children’ shall, notwithstanding section 606(b) of this title, include also 
foster care on behalf of a child described in paragraph (a) of this section.”). 
 73 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 201(a)(1), 81 Stat. 821, 
878-79 (1968) (relevant sections codified at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1970)); see Jacqueline M. 
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Then, in legislation that became effective in 1975, Congress 
created a new part D to Title IV of the Social Security Act that 
established a child support program financed by, and run in partnership 
between, the federal and state governments—commonly referred to 
today as the IV-D child support program.74 The new Title IV-D 
legislation included more specific provisions aimed at reimbursing costs 
of government welfare and foster care assistance, requiring that 
applicants or recipients of assistance assign their child support rights to 
the government and cooperate in establishing and enforcing the 
government-owed child support obligation.75 Thus, the first federal foster 
care cost recovery requirements began in 1975, simultaneously with the 
first formalization of the welfare cost recovery rules for families 
applying for AFDC welfare assistance.  
A transition occurred five years later, through the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, when the program of federal 
foster care financial assistance was pulled from the AFDC program and 
transferred to a new Title IV-E of the Social Security Act.76 In 1984, 
Congress inserted language into Title IV-E that formed the basis of foster 
care cost recovery through child support enforcement that continues 
today. The following requirement was imposed upon state child welfare 
agencies: 
[W]here appropriate, all steps will be taken, including cooperative efforts with 
the State agencies administering the program funded under part A of this 
subchapter and plan approved under part D of this subchapter, to secure an 
  
Fontana, Cooperation and Good Cause: Greater Sanctions and the Failure to Account for Domestic 
Violence, 15 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 367, 370-71 (2000) (explaining how the early AFDC rules initially 
did not require applicants to cooperate with child support offices or to assign their child support 
rights to the government).  
 74 Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2337, 
2351-52 (1975); Fontana, supra note 73, at 372; Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1033; 
Murphy, supra note 60, at 345. 
 75 Social Services Amendments of 1974 § 101(a), 88 Stat. at 2351-55 (relevant sections 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000)). 
 76 S. REP. NO. 98-387 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2432. A hiccup 
in the cost recovery efforts occurred at this time because the child support assignment and 
cooperation requirements that resided in IV-A were left behind—likely inadvertently—in the 
transition to Title IV-E. See id., 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2431-32. The report explains the law at the 
time:  
Present law.—The Federal statute does not require State child support agencies to 
undertake collection of child support on behalf of children who are placed in foster care 
under title IV-E of the Social Security Act. In addition, there is no requirement that State 
foster care agencies attempt to secure an assignment to the State of rights to support on 
behalf of children receiving foster care maintenance payments under the IV-E foster care 
program. These requirements were deleted when the foster care program was transferred 
from title IV-A to title VI-E by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 
(P.L. 96-272). 
Id. 
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assignment to the State of any rights to support on behalf of each child 
receiving foster care maintenance payments under this part.77 
Discretion is built into the federal law, allowing the agencies to decide if 
some foster care cases may not be appropriate for child support 
enforcement. However, as the next section explains, such discretion is 
often not exercised.  
3. Discretion Ignored 
Title IV-E’s “where appropriate” clause has been interpreted by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as providing states 
with flexibility to consider the children’s interests and family 
circumstances before referring a foster care case for child support 
enforcement. Federal guidance explains that “[s]tates are required to 
refer children receiving title IV-E foster care to title IV-D for child 
support enforcement, but are afforded some degree of flexibility by title 
IV-E in determining which cases are appropriate for referral.”78 “To 
determine if a case is ‘appropriate’ to refer to the title IV-D agency,” the 
guidance continues, “the State should evaluate it on an individual basis, 
considering the best interests of the child and the circumstances of the 
family.”79 Suggested factors include whether reunification is a goal and 
whether the state-owed child support obligation would be a barrier to 
reunification.80 
States vary widely in their adherence to the suggested factors. 
Some states have implemented policies to take full advantage of the 
federal flexibility by including a broad focus on the children’s best 
interests and reunification concerns,81 and other states allow exceptions 
to the referral requirement in more limited circumstances, such as when 
domestic violence is a threat.82 However, despite the suggested 
  
 77 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). The current language is substantially similar to the 1984 
statutory language. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 11, 
98 Stat. 1317, 1318 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 78 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD 
WELFARE POLICY MANUAL § 8.4C (2009), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/ 
laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_dsp.jsp?citID=170 (follow “Entire Manual” hyperlink). 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 17552 (West 2004) (California statute requiring 
consideration of the effect on reunification prior to referral of foster care case for child support 
enforcement); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.361 (West 2007) (same); R.I. DEP’T OF CHILDREN, 
YOUTH AND FAMILIES, POLICY 100.0040, CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT FOR CHILDREN IN DCYF 
CARE 1 (2004), available at http://www.dcyf.state.ri.us/docs/finalchildsupport.pdf (“DCYF is 
afforded some degree of flexibility in determining which cases are appropriate for referral. The 
DCYF worker and supervisor determine if a case is appropriate to refer to the title IV-D agency on 
an individual basis, considering the best interests of the child and the circumstances of the family.”).  
 82 See, e.g., 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 70B.0104(a) (2009) (“The county director of social 
services must refer recipients of foster care assistance payment to the child support enforcement 
program” unless determining the referral is not appropriate due to physical or emotional harm, the 
child was conceived as a result of rape or incest, or legal proceedings for adoption are pending.). 
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discretion, many states do not provide for any consideration of the 
children’s interests, possible conflicts with reunification efforts, or any 
other concerns in determining whether to initiate child support 
obligations in foster care cases. Rather, referrals for child support 
enforcement services are required regardless of any harm that might 
result.83  
4. IV-E Foster Care Versus State-Funded Foster Care 
As children enter foster care, state child welfare agencies 
scramble to seek federal financial assistance through Title IV-E federal 
foster care maintenance payments. The agencies must meet complex 
eligibility rules,84 including the requirement that children must have been 
removed from low-income households that would have been eligible for 
welfare assistance.85 The IV-E eligibility decision is significant because it 
determines whether or not the federal government will subsidize the state 
costs of providing foster care services.86 Also, the decision is 
determinative of whether the cost recovery process is required. Whereas 
federal law requires cooperative efforts between foster care and child 
support agencies to “secure an assignment to the State of any rights to 
support on behalf of each child receiving foster care maintenance 
payments” under Title IV-E, no such requirement exists for foster 
children who are not IV-E eligible.87  
However, although not mandated, states are still encouraged to 
pursue child support from the parents of children in state-funded foster 
care who are not IV-E eligible.88 The legal framework for cost recovery 
  
 83 See, e.g., MD. CODE REGS. 07.02.11.26(C) (2009) (requiring that the “local department 
shall: (1) Initiate child support for every child in out-of-home placement; and (2) Pursue support 
enforcement activity for both absent parents unless” the parents legal rights have been terminated); 
466 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 21-002-01J1 (2007) (“In all ADC and foster care IV-D cases in which 
there is not a court order for child support, the case must be referred to the county/authorized 
attorney to obtain an order for support.”); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1108(a) (2009) (“Unless 
parental rights are terminated, the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (PRS) 
must ask the county or district attorney to include a request for child support and health insurance in 
every petition for managing conservatorship and substitute-care placement, including court-ordered 
placements.”). 
 84 42 U.S.C. § 672 (2000). 
 85 Id.; see also Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, at 1821-22; Mangold, supra note 
52, at 580-81. 
 86 In addition to Title IV-E payments, state child welfare programs may be financed by a 
wide variety of sources, including multiple federal, state and local funding sources. For a description 
of the multiple funding sources, see SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 48, at 14-27. 
 87 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17); see also ACF INFO. MEMO., supra note 28, at 6 (explaining 
that 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17) does not provide authority for states to secure assignments of child 
support on behalf of foster children who are not eligible for IV-E payments). 
 88 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-04-91-
00980, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CHILDREN IN STATE FOSTER CARE, at ii, 13 (1994), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-91-00980.pdf. Although the percentage of non-IV-E cases 
receiving child support services was reported as low, the OIG report provides evidence of the 
collection efforts in state-funded foster care cases. Id. at 5. No national data has been compiled 
regarding such collections since this report, but the numbers have likely increased.  
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in state-funded foster care cases is informal. Rather than existing in 
statute or regulation, as in IV-E cases, the process is pieced together 
through informal agency communications. A series of federal directives 
issued between 1992 and 2007, titled “Information Memoranda, Action 
Transmittals, and Policy Interpretation Questions,” instruct child welfare 
agencies in how to use the IV-D child support program for state-funded 
foster care cost recovery efforts, despite the lack of legislative authority 
to do so.89  
Thus, the current legal structure both formally and informally 
encourages child support enforcement efforts in foster care cases: In IV-
E cases, the child welfare agencies must refer all “appropriate” cases for 
child support enforcement in order to adhere to federal law, and federal 
guidance continues to allow use of the IV-D child support enforcement 
services in state-funded foster care cases. While inter-agency 
collaboration is often very much needed, the resulting partnership 
between the child welfare and child support agencies is diverting 
attention from the agencies’ core missions.  
II.  CONFLICTING COLLABORATION 
The primary goals of child welfare agencies are both to protect 
the interests of children and simultaneously strengthen and preserve 
families.90 When removal of children is necessary, the agencies provide 
care for the children and services to the parents in order to assist with 
their reunification efforts. However, the children’s interests are set aside 
and the reunification efforts often derailed through the forced 
collaboration with child support agencies to recover the costs of the 
foster care services. This cost recovery focus diverts the agencies’ 
missions to a bureaucratic effort of replenishing government revenue.91 
The shift does not occur smoothly.  
A.  Child Welfare’s Diverted Mission 
When a child enters foster care and the cost recovery mechanism 
begins, another process springs to life that will ultimately determine the 
fate of the parent-child relationship. A blur of multiple court 
proceedings, caseworker visits and reports, meetings with attorneys and 
guardian ad litems, therapy and counseling sessions, parenting classes, 
and medical and psychological assessments surround the child and 
parents. Somewhere in the mix, the interests of the child and parents are 
  
 89  See infra Part III.C.3.  
 90  See Huntington, supra note 14, at 640; Sarah H. Ramsey, Children in Poverty: 
Reconciling Children’s Interests with Child Protective and Welfare Policies: A Response to Ward 
Doren and Roberts, 61 MD. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (2002) (discussing the split mission of the child 
welfare system, serving both parents and children); Spinak, supra note 14, at 335-46. 
 91 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
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hopefully given significant consideration, but a powerful force backed by 
financial incentives and statutory requirements is constantly pushing the 
entire process on a course towards terminating parental rights as quickly 
as possible. 
In 1997, the child welfare program underwent significant policy 
realignment with the enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA).92 The prior programmatic focus on family reunification was not 
eliminated, but ASFA instituted a heightened effort to promote 
adoptions.93 Out of concern for children languishing in the foster care 
system, ASFA imposed new requirements on state foster care agencies, 
along with financial rewards, in order to expedite adoptions.94 Because 
parental rights must be terminated before adoption can occur, ASFA set 
short time limits for states to begin the termination process.95 States 
responded quickly to implement the new requirements, influenced by the 
substantial financial award for each finalized adoption and no similar 
financial incentive to work towards reunification.96  
Despite the changes brought by ASFA, the provision of 
reunification services has continued as a primary child welfare agency 
mission—albeit with limitations. “[R]easonable efforts” are required “to 
preserve and reunify families.”97 Prior to placement in foster care, child 
welfare agencies are required to provide services “to prevent or eliminate 
the need for removing the child from the child’s home”98 If child removal 
occurs, reunification services are required “to make it possible for a child 
to safely return to the child’s home.”99 However, in aggravated 
  
 92 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 93 See Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families in 
the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REV. 386, 404 (2002) (explaining that “ASFA radically 
transformed the focus of federal child welfare policy” by shifting away from the “emphasis on 
family reunification that characterized its predecessor, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare 
Act of 1980 (AACWA),” to a “legislatively mandated preference for adoption”); Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to Protecting Endangered Children, 12 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 409, 410 (2005) (“The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) 
represented a major ideological shift in child welfare policy away from long term foster care and 
toward involuntary dissolution of old families and creation of new families.”). 
 94 See Doran & Roberts, supra note 93, at 338; Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held 
Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled Efforts to Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 281, 292 (2007).  
 95 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (With some exceptions for shortening or lengthening the time 
period, the law requires that “in the case of a child who has been in foster care under the 
responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months . . . the State shall file a petition to 
terminate the parental rights . . . .”).  
 96 Id. § 673(b); Sacha Coupet, Swimming Upstream Against the Great Adoption Tide: 
Making the Case for “Impermanence,” 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 405, 408 (2005) (describing the financial 
incentive structure); Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family: The 
Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 303, 336 (2006) (“The ASFA provides 
financial incentives to terminate the rights of black parents and place their children up for adoption, 
but no financial support for programs to reunify their families.”).  
 97 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  
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circumstances, such as instances of severe abuse or the murder of a 
sibling by the parent, reunification services are not required.100 Also, 
unless certain conditions are met, ASFA imposes a time limit for parents 
to successfully achieve reunification by requiring states to initiate 
termination of parental rights proceedings as soon as a child has been in 
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.101 Moreover, 
“concurrent planning” is also allowed under the Act, permitting child 
welfare agencies to actively pursue adoption while simultaneously 
providing the required reunification services.102  
Thus, a core mission of the child welfare system continues to be 
strengthening and preserving families. ASFA limits the required services, 
and adds a focus on promoting adoption, but reunification services 
continue as a central component of required case-planning goals.103 
However, with the insertion of the government’s cost recovery pursuit 
into the mix, the remaining reunification requirements are often 
subverted. Already impoverished parents are further burdened by 
government-owed child support obligations, hampering their struggle to 
reunify with their children.  
B. The Consequences: Cost Recovery Versus Family Reunification 
The majority of children taken into foster care are removed from 
their parents due to the circumstances of poverty.104 Further, the policies 
and funding structure of the child welfare system encourage child 
removal rather than preventive services,105 and federal law limits the time 
period for reunification services.106  Yet for some parents, hope remains. 
  
 100 Id. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii); see also Unified Family Courts and the Child Protection 
Dilemma, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2099, 2115 (2003) [hereinafter Unified Family Courts] (describing the 
various limitations on reunification requirements under ASFA). 
 101 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E); Murphy, supra note 17, at 976-77; Unified Family Courts, 
supra note 100, at 2115. 
 102 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F); Unified Family Courts, supra note 100, at 2116. 
 103 See Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America’s 
Disposable Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to Present, 
29 J. LEGIS. 51, 75-76 (2002); Woodhouse, supra note 93, at 419 (explaining that further 
amendments after ASFA “sought to improve not only the procedure through which adoptions would 
be secured . . . , but also reinforced ASFA’s original goal of engendering ‘community-based family 
support services, family preservation services, [and] time-limited family reunification 
services . . . .’” (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-133, § 101, 115 Stat. 2413, 2414 (2002))) (third alteration 
in original). Sanders explains that: 
ASFA has not abandoned the family preservation model, but merely subordinated it to 
child safety and permanency timeline goals. The operative reasonable efforts language 
still requires that agencies continue to work toward eliminating a need for removal or 
reunification unless one of the two ASFA exceptions, either the existence of aggravating 
circumstances, or the exhaustion of reasonable efforts, is met. 
Sanders, supra, at 75-76. 
 104 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.  
 105 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
 106 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
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After their children are removed, agency caseworkers may attempt to 
break through the bureaucratic barriers,107 actively seek to develop a 
relationship of trust with the parents, and develop cooperative case-plans 
to work toward the families’ reunification.108 For example, if the 
circumstances leading to child removal included lack of housing, 
unemployment, and substance abuse, the caseworker may arrange needed 
service referrals for the parents to search for suitable housing, participate 
in a drug treatment program, and complete job training to help find stable 
employment.  
The years of poverty’s effects are not easily overcome, but with 
caseworker assistance the parents can make gradual steps towards 
meeting the agency’s requirements for reunification. However, just when 
the parents’ personal and economic circumstances are the most 
vulnerable, and the need for agency assistance the greatest, the child 
welfare agency’s role as social services provider is abruptly overlaid with 
the task of debt collector. As the agencies follow the requirements to 
refer cases for child support enforcement actions in order to recover 
government costs,109 the parents are saddled with new, and often 
unrealistic, debt payments that can further destabilize the economic 
picture and undermine their reunification efforts.110  
Very little attention has been paid to the logistics or results of the 
government effort to pursue, and keep, child support payments from 
parents of children in foster care. The policy was initially an 
afterthought, tacked on to the government’s related but broader interest 
in pursuing child support against absent fathers to reimburse the costs of 
welfare benefits provided to their children.111 Even when the requirement 
was separated from the broader welfare cost recovery efforts in 1984,112 
little attention was paid to state implementation of the child support 
requirements related to children in foster care. Then, in 1992, the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) investigated state practices and completed a report calling for 
improved coordination between foster care and child support agencies.113  
Although child support for children in foster care is used to 
reimburse government costs rather than to assist the children, the OIG 
  
 107 See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race and 
Class in the Child Protection System [An Essay], 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 600-03 (1997) (discussing the 
bureaucratic problems that reduce the effectiveness of reunification services).  
 108 42 U.S.C. § 675(1)(b); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b), 1356.21(g)(4) (2007). 
 109 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 110 See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1074-79 (describing the difficulty of 
low-income child support obligors to keep up with required child support payments); Stotland, supra 
note 4, at 321 (describing the negative impact of child support enforcement efforts in foster care 
cases on reunification goals). 
 111 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 112 S. REP. NO. 98-387, at 35-36 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2397, 2432. 
 113 See 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at i-ii (noting the low child support collection 
rates for foster children at the time of the report and recommending collaboration for referrals of 
foster care cases for child support enforcement); see also id. at ii-iii. 
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asserted that children receive benefits from child support enforcement 
services and were thus deprived by inadequate child support referrals: 
“[C]hildren in IV-E Foster Care are being deprived the opportunity to 
receive IV-D Child Support services they are entitled to receive.”114 The 
contradictory nature of the assertion is readily apparent, because child 
support collections in foster care cases do not benefit the children.115 
However, the OIG contended that foster children benefit indirectly, 
through paternity establishments that may trigger possible inheritance 
and insurance rights and “possibly vital information regarding 
genetically-linked medical problems.”116 Further, the report claimed, 
“without the absent parent(s) being located, the child cannot form social 
relationships with the parent(s).”117  
The OIG’s self-constructed, positive view of child support 
services for foster children was not shared by caseworkers or the child 
welfare agency’s leadership. As the report itself recognized, caseworkers 
often “expressed opinions that families of IV-E Foster Care children are 
‘too poor to pay,’” and “that enforcing child support will be detrimental 
to the parent/child relationship.”118 The caseworkers “do not believe that 
child support serves to stabilize the family unit and help insure its future 
integrity.”119 The concern most often expressed regarding enforcement of 
child support obligations in foster care cases was related to family 
reunification.120 Responding to the OIG report, the U.S. Department of 
Health & Human Service’s (HHS) Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation (ASPE) did not mince words regarding the concern: 
I believe your draft does not address several important issues, and therefore 
oversimplifies the extent to which Child Support collections for foster care 
children can or should be pursued . . . . The report does not adequately address 
the real and perceived conflicts between the activities and goals of the IV-D 
program (maximizing collections) and those of the IV-E program (maximizing 
family reunification).121  
In fact, the OIG recognized the conflicting goals, but in the context of 
frustration with low child support-enforcement numbers. Explaining that 
the “focus and approach of IV-E Foster Care and IV-D Child Support 
agencies varied considerably,” the report placed blame for infrequent 
child support enforcement referrals on the foster care caseworkers’ desire 
to actually help their clients:122  
  
 114 Id. at 5. 
 115 See supra Part I.B.  
 116 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.  
 117 Id.  
 118 Id. at 7. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id.  
 121 Id. at app. E.  
 122 Id. at 7. 
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Foster care staff are oriented to talk and in terms of an individual child. They 
form interpersonal relationships with the families they serve. On the other 
hand, most IV-D Child Support Staff view themselves as adversaries of “absent 
parents.” The child support staff tend to be “bottom line oriented.”123  
The focus on the bottom line won out in the OIG’s view, as the core 
thrust of the report called for improved collaboration with child support 
staff in order to increase child support enforcement in foster care cases.124 
Regarding the reservations expressed by HHS leadership, the OIG 
acknowledged but quickly disregarded the concerns: “We agree that 
child support should only be pursued in ‘appropriate’ cases. However, 
we continue to believe that the majority of children in foster care can 
benefit from IV-D Child Support services, such as paternity 
establishment and locating absent parents.”125   
Under the lens of the economic realities confronting foster 
children’s parents, the arguments in favor of increased child support 
services in foster care cases do not withstand scrutiny.  The majority of 
child removals occur due to the circumstances of family poverty.126 Child 
support enforcement efforts against these low-income families result in 
no financial support to the children, conflicts with family reunification 
efforts, and can damage the relationship between caseworker and 
client.127 In fact, while advocating the need for increased child support 
enforcement services for foster children, the OIG used as an example a 
case where the child support referral harmed the reunification efforts:  
In one case, the parent and foster care worker established sufficient trust to 
allow a child to return home. However, at about the same time, a IV-D Child 
Support agent served a summons to bring the parent to court. The parent’s 
anger at the ‘government’ damaged the reunification process.128  
Moreover, at a time when the child welfare system hopes to 
increase the involvement of absent fathers in their children’s lives,129 
increased child support enforcement efforts will likely have the reverse 
effect.130 Pursuing government-owed child support often further alienates 
parents from each other and causes the noncustodial fathers to further 
  
 123 Id.  
 124 Id. at ii.  
 125 Id. at iii.  
 126 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.  
 127 See generally Stotland, supra note 4 (describing the tensions between child support 
enforcement for foster children and efforts to reunify the children with their parents).  
 128 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.  
 129 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & 
FAM., WHAT ABOUT THE DADS? CHILD WELFARE AGENCIES’ EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY, LOCATE AND 
INVOLVE NONRESIDENT FATHERS (2006), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/06/cw-involve-
dads/report.pdf (providing detailed analysis of child welfare agency efforts to engage absent fathers 
and expressing the desire to increase involvement of the fathers of children in foster care). 
 130 See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1079-82.  
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retreat from the agency in pursuit.131 If the first hand reaching out turns to 
slap an absent father with an unmanageable child support order,132 
suspended driver’s license,133 the threat of incarceration due to 
contempt,134 and garnishment of sixty-five percent of his take home pay 
for an obligation that will not help his child135—the result will not be 
positive.136  
Finally, the assertion that foster children benefit from child 
support enforcement actions through the identification and location of 
their absent parents is based upon an incorrect premise.137 A full referral 
for child support enforcement is not necessary for a foster child to 
receive paternity establishment or parental location services.138 As HHS 
recently explained in a 2007 Information Memorandum, federal law 
specifically permits child welfare agencies to request parental location 
assistance from IV-D child support offices without actually referring 
foster care cases for child support enforcement.139 Similarly, child 
welfare agencies can pursue paternity determinations on their own 
initiative, without necessitating the initiation of child support 
obligations.140  
Thus, because enforcing foster care cost recovery debts through 
child support enforcement does not yield benefits to children, the only 
  
 131 Id. at 1079, 1081; Murphy, supra note 60, at 362-65; see also Lisa Kelly, If Anybody 
Asks You Who I Am: An Outsider’s Story of the Duty to Establish Paternity, 6 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 297 (1994) (describing the paternity/child support docket, including the negative impact 
on the relationship between the parents by forcing the mother to pursue child support in order to 
receive welfare assistance).  
 132 See, e.g., Karen Syma Czapanskiy, ALI Child Support Principles: A Lesson in Public 
Policy and Truth-Telling, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 259, 261-62 (2001) (discussing possible 
negative effects when child support obligations are set too high for low-income obligors); Murphy, 
supra note 60, at 353-55 (explaining child support orders are often unrealistically high for low-
income fathers).  
 133 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (2000) (federal law requiring states to develop procedures to 
suspend driver’s licenses as a child support enforcement tool). 
 134 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (Similar to other state constitutions, Maryland’s 
constitution generally prohibits incarceration for a debt but explains that “support of a spouse or 
dependent children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or children, or for alimony . . . shall not 
constitute a debt within the meaning of this section.”).  
 135 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2006).  
 136 In addition to negative impact on the family relationships, the enforcement of child 
support obligations against low-income fathers can cause retreat from the above-ground workforce. 
See PETER EDELMAN ET AL., RECONNECTING DISADVANTAGED YOUNG MEN 19 (2006). In addition 
to several other factors that have caused a decline in workforce participation among young African-
American men, the authors conclude that child support enforcement policies are a contributing 
factor. Id.  
 137 See 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.  
 138 See id. at 5-6.  
 139 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAM., 
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM, ACYF-CB-IM-07-06 7-8 (2007), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/2007/im0706.pdf; see also 42 U.S.C. § 653(c)(4) (2000). 
 140 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 5 (West 2008) (explaining that 
“[c]omplaints under this chapter to establish paternity . . . may be commenced by . . . the authorized 
agent of the department of social services or any agency licensed under chapter twenty-eight A 
provided that the child is in their custody”). 
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remaining impact, other than the government’s own fiscal interest, is 
harm. And as the next section explains, even the fiscal benefit to the 
government is in doubt.  
C.  The Economics: What Little We Know About the Numbers 
Very little is known regarding the effectiveness of child support 
enforcement in foster care cases. In its 1992 report, the OIG predicted 
potentially significant government savings, but the analysis was based 
upon uncertain data.141 Little consideration has been paid to the issue 
since.  
The OIG concluded that the cost recovery policy would result in 
fiscal success through an improved partnership between child welfare 
and child support agencies.142 However, the report’s projected 
government savings initially failed to consider administrative costs. An 
HHS response cautioned that “[t]he amount of savings potential from IV-
E collections cited in the report is overly optimistic [because] [i]t does 
not seem to take into account the cost of providing Child Support 
Enforcement services.”143 The OIG acknowledged the oversight, but then, 
unable to accurately determine the administrative costs, simply guessed: 
“We are unable to calculate the marginal change in administrative costs 
that might be attributable to additional collections. However, to roughly 
estimate possible Federal savings, we arbitrarily reduced the net Federal 
share of collections by fifty percent.”144 The report then concluded that if 
the percentage of children receiving child support enforcement services 
had increased to half of all IV-E foster care cases in 1990, the resulting 
collections would have reached $74 million.145 The federal share of the 
collections would have been $22.6 million, and thus $11.3 million in 
estimated federal savings (using the arbitrary fifty percent administrative 
cost reduction).146   
Unfortunately, the guess is still a guess. Despite the promising 
prognosis, the OIG has not reviewed the cost effectiveness again, and the 
necessary data to adequately compare collections with costs is still not 
available. Total child support collections in foster care cases are 
known,147 but the relevant administrative costs are not.  The costs are 
only tracked for the total child support caseload rather than broken down 
  
 141 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at ii. 
 142 Id. The report’s finding indicated that only 11.6% of the sampled children in foster 
care were included in a child support order and that few foster care agencies had effective practices 
for referring cases to the IV-D child support program. Id. at 5, 7-8. 
 143 Id. at app. E.  
 144 Id. at 16, app. D-2.  
 145 Id. at app. D-1.  
 146 Id. at app. D-2.  
 147 See OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, tbl. 9 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter FY 2004 ANNUAL 
REPORT], available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/reports/annual_report/table_9.html. 
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by type of case.148 Thus, with the data currently available, comparing 
child support collections in foster care cases with the portion of 
administrative costs applicable to those collections is not possible.149  
Of the numbers that are available, the picture does not look 
overly promising. Certainly, the enforcement efforts and resulting 
collections have grown. Total distributed foster care collections reached 
$90 million in 2004,150 22% greater than the $74 million that the OIG 
estimated would have led to $11.3 million in federal savings in 1990.151 
However, the total administrative costs grew at a much faster rate: over 
330% during the same time period, from $1.6 billion in 1990 to $5.3 
billion in 2004.152 Again, the portion of increased administrative costs 
relevant to foster care cases is unknown, but as the administrative costs 
continue to increase, the cost benefit of child support collections in foster 
care cases is further in doubt.153 
In contrast to cost recovery collections, the collection efforts 
have been a great success in those cases where child support is owed to 
children rather than to the government. Almost $22 billion in child 
support collections were distributed directly to children and their families 
in 2006, a return on investment of over 400%.154  
Therefore, the conclusion is clear. When child support benefits 
children, the collection effort is well worth the cost. When child support 
is routed toward cost recovery, the questionable fiscal benefit to the 
government is simply not worth the harm that results. Further, in addition 
  
 148 See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1073.  
 149 Further, the number of foster care cases in the total child support caseload is also not 
known. The Federal Office of Child Support Enforcement only requires states to provide the number 
of “current assistance” cases, combining both IV-E and TANF cases without the numbers broken 
down by type of assistance. See E-Mail from Kenneth Dittmar, Office of Child Support 
Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Aug. 15, 2007, 12:39 EST) (on file with 
author) (confirming that the federal child support agency does not have data available regarding the 
number of foster care cases in the child support caseload). Were the number of foster care cases in 
the child support caseload available, an estimation of relevant administrative costs would be 
possible. See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1070-74 (providing the analysis of how to 
estimate administrative costs in welfare cost recovery cases where the number of cases with current 
or former welfare assistance is provided).  
 150 FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147.  
 151 1992 OIG REPORT, supra note 2, at app. D. 
 152 FY 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.1; STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & 
MEANS, 108TH CONG., 2004 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON THE PROGRAMS 
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS tbl. 8-1 (Comm. Print 2004), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmprints/green/2004.html (listing 1990 administrative costs 
for the child support program).  
 153 As a further comparison, an examination of the cost efficiency in cost recovery 
collections in all current assistance cases (both TANF and foster care cases combined) reveals that 
the effort results little if any fiscal benefit to the government. Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, 
at 1070-74.  
 154 Id. at 1070; OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, FY 2006 PRELIMINARY REPORT tbl.1 (2007), 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2007/preliminary_report/table_1.html 
(listing total collections not retained by the government at almost $22 billion, and total 
administrative costs at $5.56 billion).  
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to the negative policy implications of the cost recovery effort, the next 
part of the Article analyzes the significant legal concerns that also result.  
III.  LEGAL CROSSROADS 
The forced intersection of foster care and child support causes 
the agencies to straddle competing goals: serving the interests of children 
and parents while simultaneously pursing assigned child support that 
harms the children and parents. In addition to the negative policy effects 
and questionable fiscal soundness discussed above, several legal 
concerns emerge at the crossroads.  
A.  Illegal Diversion 
The first legal problem stems from the diversion of the child 
welfare system’s primary purposes towards the cost recovery pursuit. 
Family reunification continues to be a core agency mission,155 but 
enforcing government-owed child support obligations against the parents 
of foster children undermines the reunification goal. The diversion is not 
only bad policy; it’s contrary to federal law.  
Unless a specific exception applies, child welfare agencies are 
federally required to make “reasonable efforts” in order “to preserve and 
reunify families.”156 The reunification services must be incorporated into 
a case plan, including a description of the services to be provided, in 
order to help improve the parents’ circumstances so that a safe 
reunification may be possible.157 Further, states must establish a “case 
review system” to regularly review the appropriateness of the plan and 
progress toward meeting the plan’s goals.158  
Reunification services and case planning requirements are aimed 
at ensuring that parents receive needed assistance to help address the 
problems that led to child removal.159 The services and plans are 
supposed to help make reunification more likely, not add burdens 
irrelevant to the children’s interests or that do not address the causes for 
child removal.160 However, foster care cost recovery through child 
support enforcement imposes precisely such an irrelevant barrier. The 
  
 155 See supra Part II.A. 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (2000). 
 157 Id. § 675(1)(B); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1356.21(b), 1356.21(g)(4) (2007). 
 158 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5). 
 159 Id. § 675(5)(B) (requiring case reviews to consider “the extent of compliance with the 
case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the 
causes necessitating placement in foster care”); Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State 
Courts Think, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 321, 345 (2005). 
 160 Bean, supra note 159, at 345 (“In order for the plan to be reasonable, it must have 
been created to fix the problems that required state involvement. The case plan must not ‘consist of 
“a litany of required services that [are] not related to the conditions that eventually gave rise to the 
dependency adjudication.”’” (quoting In re Child of E.V., 634 N.W.2d 443, 447 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001))) (footnotes omitted) (alteration in original). 
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government-owed debt does not serve the children’s interests, is 
unrelated to circumstances that lead to removal, and the additional 
obligation will harm an already impoverished parent’s reunification 
efforts. Although not specifically addressing the issue of government-
owed child support, a Minnesota court describes the concern: 
At a minimum, “reasonable efforts” requires the responsible agency to provide 
those services that would assist in alleviating the conditions leading to the 
determination of dependency. In this case, the welfare department did not 
provide any supportive services that would alleviate the financial stresses that 
existed in the home. Instead, the foster placement plan imposes additional 
financial obligations on the parent.161 
In fact, the federal law establishing the cost recovery 
requirements also recognizes the potential conflict with case-planning 
goals. States are required to “secure an assignment” of child support 
rights in foster care cases only “where appropriate,”162 meaning only 
when not contrary to the best interests of the child or in conflict with 
reunification efforts.163 Thus, a harmonious implementation of the 
otherwise conflicting federal requirements is suggested. However, as 
explained in Part I.B.3, many states ignore the available discretion and 
refer foster care cases for child support enforcement regardless of the 
negative effect.164  
Even worse, not only do states often blindly initiate the cost 
recovery process without consideration of the conflict with reunification 
goals, many states include the payment of government-owed child 
support as a required element in the reunification plans.165 If the debt is 
not paid, the children are not returned. Although the case plans are 
  
 161 In re Welfare of M.A., 408 N.W.2d 227, 235-36 (Minn. App. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 162 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 163 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILD 
WELFARE POLICY MANUAL, 8.4C TITLE IV-E, GENERAL TITLE IV-E REQUIREMENTS, CHILD 
SUPPORT, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/laws_policies/laws/cwpm/policy_ 
dsp.jsp?citID=170. 
 164 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 165 See, e.g., Beverlin v. Arkansas Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. CA 07-313, 
2007 WL 3088278, at *1 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct 24, 2007) (discussing “appellants’ failure to comply 
with other portions of the case plan, e.g., their failure to pay court-ordered child support and their 
failure to maintain stable employment and stable living arrangements”); W.N. v. Dep’t of Children 
& Family Servs., 919 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Both parents entered into a 
reunification case plan which required W.N., among other things, to participate in a substance abuse 
program, attend parenting classes, pay child support and remain drug free.”); In re K.S., 658 S.E.2d 
403, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“The mother failed to comply with her case plans, especially the 
requirements to maintain a drug-free home, maintain stable income, pay child support . . . .”); State 
ex rel. S.C.M., 986 So. 2d 875, 879 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[T]he case plan required B.E.M. to: . . . (7) 
financially support her children by paying child support as ordered; (8) attend domestic violence 
counseling; (9) maintain a stable, safe home and maintain all utilities . . . .”); In re D.M., 615 S.E.2d 
669, 672 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“Respondent’s case plan objectives included: (1) complete the 
NOVA program; (2) attend visits with D.M.; (3) pay child support . . . .”), aff’d, 622 S.E.2d 494 
(N.C. 2005); In re A.D., 151 P.3d 1102, 1106 (Wyo. 2007) (“The case plan also required that 
Mother support her children by maintaining full-time employment, providing health insurance and 
paying child support.”). 
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intended to serve as collaborative road maps to help guide the parents 
towards reunification, the plans are converted into debt-collection tools 
with the children held out as leverage.    
When states fail to consider the impact of the cost recovery debt 
on reunification efforts, or when the debt is added as an additional 
obligation into the reunification plans, the federal laws requiring 
reunification services are violated. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in 
Suter v. Artist M. held that the requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) to 
provide “reasonable efforts . . . to make it possible for the child to return 
to his home” is not enforceable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.166 However, 
other options remain viable. The violation can be challenged at several 
points in the child dependency process, including the initial judicial 
determination establishing the child support obligation,167 during the 
required six-month review hearings or the annual permanency 
hearings,168 and by separate motion to reconsider or modify an already 
existing order.169 Relief may also be available under a state administrative 
procedures act170 or by writ of mandamus.171 Further, although the Suter 
decision banned § 1983 claims to enforce the reasonable efforts 
requirement in 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(15), private causes of action to enforce 
other statutory provisions may be possible.172  
  
 166 Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-63 (1992). 
 167 States vary in the procedure of setting the initial child support order. For example, the 
order might be established in the same juvenile court proceedings determining dependency, in a 
separate child support hearing with separate case number, or an administrative proceeding.  
 168 42 U.S.C. § 675(5) (2000). 
 169 Such a motion might seek a juvenile court to reconsider the establishment of a child 
support obligation under the discretion provided in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15), or seek modification of a 
child support order under state statutory discretion to deviate downward from the guidelines’ 
recommended amount. See, e.g., In re Joshua W., 617 A.2d 1154, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) 
(“[A] downward departure from the guidelines could be justified as in the best interests of a child in 
foster care if the court found, in the proper case, that such an adjustment was necessary for the parent 
to obtain the economic stability necessary to regain custody and care properly for the child.”). 
 170 E.g., MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 10-222 (West 2009) (provision of the Maryland 
Administrative Procedures Act explaining that “a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a 
contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section”). 
 171 E.g., MD. R. CIR. CT. R. 7-401 (2008) (providing the procedures for seeking a writ of 
administrative mandamus, described as “actions for judicial review of a quasi-judicial order or action 
of an administrative agency where review is not expressly authorized by law”). See generally Sam 
Walker, Judicially Created Uncertainty: The Past, Present, and Future of California Writ of 
Administrative Mandamus, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783 (1991) (explaining history of administrative 
mandamus in California). 
 172 See Sara J. Klein, Note, Protecting the Rights of Foster Children: Suing Under § 1983 
to Enforce Federal Child Welfare Law, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2611, 2629-30 (2005) (describing the 
congressional “Suter fix,” wherein Congress attempted to ensure that other child welfare provisions 
of the Social Security Act might be enforceable); Sankaran, supra note 94, at 311 n.133 (“Although 
the Supreme Court held, in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), that the ‘reasonable efforts’ 
provisions in the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act did not create a private cause of action, 
lower courts, subsequent to that decision, have found other provisions of the AACWA to be 
enforceable through litigation.” (citation omitted)); Everett Skillman, The Adoption Assistance and 
Child Welfare Act and the Minor’s Civil Rights Remedies, 14 TRINITY L. REV. 1, 13-14 & n.44 
(2007) (noting that despite Suter, courts have held that other provisions in the AACWA (including 
reunification services and case planning requirements) are enforceable under § 1983) (citing Kenny 
A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 218 F.R.D. 277, 292 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. 
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Time is of the essence in the advocacy strategy chosen. For as 
the next section explains, the end of the parent-child relationship may be 
fast approaching if the conflict with reunification goals is not remedied.   
B.  Constitutional Implications: Terminating Parental Rights for a 
Government-Owed Debt 
“We have not rid ourselves of debtors prisons only to substitute for that 
Dickensian horror, the termination of the debtor’s parental rights.”173 
Many states include the failure to pay child support as a factor in 
the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights, sometimes allowing 
that factor alone to warrant termination.174 The subordination of the 
parent-child relationship to the government’s fiscal interests is 
unconstitutional.    
A parent’s purposeful refusal to support a child might initially 
seem relevant to whether a termination of parental rights is in the child’s 
interests. However, child support for a foster child is owed to the 
government,175 and the relevant government interest in termination of 
parental rights proceedings is protecting the welfare of children—not 
collecting a government-owed debt.176 An analogous scenario can 
provide a comparison: If a parent takes out a government loan to help 
pay the costs of a child’s education and then defaults on the loan, should 
the default result in termination of the parent-child relationship?177 
Clearly, a child in foster care presents a far different context from that of 
a student loan. In an involuntary foster care placement, the child is 
removed from the family home because of parental abuse or neglect and 
the government is forced to expend resources to care for the child. 
However, although the initial circumstances leading up to the financial 
obligations differ, the parental debt is the same: obligations owed to the 
government, not to the child.  
Application of the debt obligation as grounds for terminating 
parental rights presents a disturbing injection of agency cost recovery 
efforts into the child welfare mission, with the children treated as 
leverage. If parents keep up with the payments in order to reimburse 
  
Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 2000); Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 
F. Supp. 662, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997); Jeanine B. ex rel. Blondis v. 
Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268, 1283-85 (E.D. Wis. 1995)). 
 173 In re Adoption of J.W.M., 532 N.W.2d 372, 380 (N.D. 1995) (Levine, J., dissenting) 
(discussing reliance on unpaid child support as grounds for termination of parental rights in petition 
for adoption), overruled by In re Adoption of S.R.F., 683 N.W.2d 913 (N.D. 2004).  
 174 See supra note 22. 
 175 42 USC § 671(a)(17) (2000). 
 176 See supra Part II.A (describing the purpose of the child welfare system).  
 177 Although government student loans are often obtained in the names of the students, 
parents can also take student loans for their children. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Office of Fed. Student 
Aid, PLUS Loans (Parent Loans), http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/parentloans.jsp 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2009). 
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foster care costs, they may have a chance of reunification with their 
children. Failure to pay the debt may be a factor causing the child-
collateral to be lost.  
Several state courts have allowed such terminations based upon 
child support obligations to proceed.178 For example, in the case briefly 
discussed in the Introduction, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
upheld the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father solely 
because the father’s failure to pay child support to reimburse state 
costs.179 The child had done well in her father’s care prior to his 
incarceration, and the child welfare agency agreed to plans for 
reunification after prison release.180 But, as if guided by a split 
personality of competing purposes, the agency simultaneously sought to 
terminate the father’s parental rights.181 The relevant statutory provision 
allowing termination of parental rights for government-owed child 
support explains: 
(a) The court may terminate the parental rights upon a finding of one or more 
of the following: 
. . . 
(3) The juvenile has been placed in the custody of a county department of 
social services . . . and the parent, for a continuous period of six months next 
preceding the filing of the petition or motion, has willfully failed for such 
period to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the juvenile although 
physically and financially able to do so.182 
Although the father made only pennies a day through work in the prison 
kitchen, and he was under no court order to pay child support, the court 
found “there was clear and convincing evidence that [the father] had an 
ability to pay an amount greater than zero.”183 The opinion includes no 
discussion of why the termination was in the child’s best interests other 
than to state that because a statutory ground for termination existed 
(failure to pay child support), the trial court was correct in concluding the 
child’s interests were served.184 Whereas the majority opinion includes 
  
 178 However, not all courts have indicated termination of parental rights is appropriate 
based upon the failure to pay child support where there is insufficient evidence of the parent’s ability 
to pay. E.g., In re T.H., 979 So. 2d 1075, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (“In the absence of some 
evidence that the Father was able to provide financial support for T.D.H. while incarcerated and that 
he failed to do so, termination of this Father’s parental rights on this basis is improper.”). 
 179 See generally In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 610 S.E.2d 
1999 (N.C. 2005) (per curiam). 
 180 See id. at 740, 742 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 181 See id. at 739, 742.  
 182 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (West Supp. 2008). 
 183 In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2d at 738 (majority opinion). 
 184 Id. (“[B]ecause we conclude that the trial court properly determined that grounds for 
termination existed under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3), we also hold that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that it was in T.D.P.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental 
rights.”). 
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few facts to understand the story behind the ruling, the dissenting opinion 
fills in some details regarding the incarcerated father’s circumstances: 
Since his parents were deceased and he did not have any siblings, he contacted 
his aunt who reared him to see if she could care for his daughter; but, she was 
unable to do so. As he did not have any other relatives whom he could 
recommend as potential caretakers of T.D.P., his daughter remained in foster 
care.  
. . . He sent letters to his daughter’s social worker to inquire about her well-
being and development. . . . Then, at Christmas, T.D.P.’s father arranged to 
have a Christmas gift sent to his daughter through the Angel Tree 
organization. . . .  
  While incarcerated T.D.P.’s father called the social worker as often as 
possible to inquire about his daughter.  
. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . During his service in the U.S. Army from 1978-1983, from which he 
received two honorable discharges, T.D.P.’s father earned his GED. . . . Prior to 
his incarceration, he worked as a restaurant cook and the restaurant manager 
told him she would rehire him upon his release.  
. . . . 
. . . [W]hile T.D.P. was in her father’s care, DSS concluded the minor child was 
happy, healthy, clothed and well-fed. . . . Due to his good behavior, his release 
date had been changed to an earlier date, December 2003.185  
A DSS-approved plan was in place for the child to be reunified with her 
father in January 2004 after his release from prison.186 But the race to 
terminate parental rights, fueled by focus on cost recovery, trumped the 
reunification plan.   
Other than explaining that the father could have paid “an amount 
greater than zero,”187 no indication was provided by the majority opinion 
as to how much in child support payments would have been sufficient to 
cover a “reasonable portion of the cost of care” and thus prevent the 
termination.188 The dissenting opinion recognized that at forty cents a 
day, the father earned only $2.80 per week during the relevant time 
period.189 Thus, considering his total earnings and the maximum amount 
of support he could have paid during the six-month statutory period, the 
  
 185 Id. at 739-40 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
 186 Id. at 742. 
 187  Id. at 738 (majority opinion). 
 188 See id. at 737 (quoting the trial court’s decision) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 189 Although the majority opinion initially explains that the father’s income ranged 
between forty cents and one dollar per day while he was incarcerated, see id. at 737, the dissenting 
opinion seems to indicate that the relevant income during the statutory period was limited to forty 
cents per day, or $2.80 per week, see id. at 740 (Wynn, J., dissenting). 
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father’s parental rights were terminated for a government debt of 
$72.80.190  
Next, a 2007 Georgia case provides an example where unpaid 
child support is not the sole grounds for terminating parental rights, but a 
significant factor.191 A seventeen-year old girl had a child while in foster 
care, and the mother and daughter were separated because the child 
welfare agency placed the mother in a foster home that would not take 
the baby.192 Although the separation did not occur due to any allegations 
of maltreatment, the agency required that the mother—while still in 
foster care herself—to pay child support as part of her reunification 
plan.193 The plan imposed multiple obligations upon the troubled 
teenaged mother, including that she complete her education while 
simultaneously finding employment in order to pay child support to 
reimburse costs of her daughter’s care.194 Then, just six months after the 
mother aged out of foster care at eighteen and was engaged in a struggle 
for economic stability, the child welfare agency filed a petition to 
terminate her parental rights.195 The trial court concluded:  
[T]here is no doubt that this mother loves this child. However, her own 
circumstances have placed her in the position of not being able to provide the 
basic necessities for the child since the child’s birth one and one-half years 
ago.196  
In addition to the presence of a possible adoptive resource for the child, 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia looked to several factors as grounds for 
upholding the termination, circumstances that often confront foster 
children as they attempt to transition to independence.197 The mother had 
not completed her GED and was unable to “maintain stable housing and 
employment.”198 She continued to suffer from mental illnesses including 
post traumatic stress disorder, ADHD, and borderline personality 
disorder, which were likely exacerbated by abuse and neglect before she 
was placed in foster care at age 15.199 The court noted that because the 
  
 190 Using the dissent’s explanation that the father earned forty cents per day, the 
maximum amount the father could have earned during the six-month statutory period was $72.80. 
See id. at 740.  
 191 See generally In re D.L.T., 641 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 238 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the trial court’s decision). 
 197 See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Avoiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The Undoing of the 
California Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity in Foster Care 
Placement and Supervision, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267, 278 (2004) (“[A]fter leaving foster 
care, 27% of males were incarcerated within twelve to eighteen months, 50% were unemployed, 
37% did not graduate from high school, 33% were on public assistance, 47% were receiving 
counseling or medication for medical problems just before leaving the system, and 33% were 
diagnosed with three or more psychiatric problems.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 198 In re D.L.T., 641 S.E.2d at 239.  
 199 Id. at 237-38. 
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mother would no longer receive Medicaid coverage after she aged out of 
foster care, she would be unable to afford medications needed to treat her 
mental illness.200 And, in addition to her unfortunate status as a former 
foster child struggling to make it on her own, the court placed emphasis 
on the fact that the mother was $220 in arrears in her child support 
obligation owed to the government.201  
The examples are not isolated occurrences. In another North 
Carolina case, the court upheld a termination of parental rights for unpaid 
child support where the parent paid $136 of $300 owed.202 South 
Carolina courts have repeatedly held that incarcerated parents’ parental 
rights can be terminated on the sole ground of failing to pay government-
owed child support.203 In Georgia, court decisions regarding the 
termination of parental rights of a disabled father and an incarcerated 
mother echoed a description that the state’s “law requires a parent to 
financially support his or her child while the child is in foster care, even 
in the absence of a court order”204 and “even if personally disabled”205 or 
“unable to earn income.”206 And in New York, unwed fathers can even 
lose the right to be heard through contested termination of parental rights 
proceedings: the statutory framework in New York not only considers 
child support as a significant factor, but if unwed fathers cannot prove 
that they have paid sufficient child support for their children in foster 
care, then the fathers are denied the right to object to potential adoptions 
or to have their rights considered in termination of parental rights 
hearings.207  
  
 200 See id. at 238-39. 
 201 See id. at 238.  
 202 In re E.F.C.K., 623 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished table decision); see 
also In re C.W., 628 S.E.2d 259 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished table decision) (“[R]espondent 
had a duty to defray the costs of care of the children, who were in the custody of DSS for six months 
prior to the filing of the motion to terminate parental rights. . . . The trial court did not err by finding 
and concluding that a ground existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3).”). 
 203 E.g., S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 519 S.E.2d 351 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999); S.C. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Phillips, 391 S.E.2d 584 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
 204 E.g., In re A.R.A.S., 629 S.E.2d 822, 827 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); In re C.M., 621 S.E.2d 
815, 816 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (examples of multiple cases using the same phrase). 
 205 In re C.M., 275 Ga. App. at 721.  
 206 In re A.R.A.S., 278 Ga. App. at 613.  
 207  In New York, a statute establishes a presumption that an unwed father does not have 
the right to object to an adoption proceeding unless he proves certain factors demonstrating a 
substantial relationship with the child. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1)(d) (McKinney 2009). The first 
required element the father must prove is “the payment by the father toward the support of the 
child.” Id. § 111(1)(d)(i). Even if the father can prove the other statutory factors of regular visitation 
or communications, a father who has been unable to provide financial support may not be able to 
overcome the presumption against his right to object. The statutory requirement was held to be 
unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of one case. See In re M./B. Children, 792 N.Y.S.2d 
785, 794 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004). However, in other cases where child support is the sole issue, the 
provisions continue to be upheld. See, e.g., In re Latricia M., 867 N.Y.S.2d 402, 402 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008) (denying an unwed father’s motion to be deemed a “consent father” with the right to 
object to adoption for the sole reason of not proving the payment of sufficient child support).  
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The loss of parental rights may very well have been in the best 
interests of the children in the example cases discussed above. However, 
much is not known regarding the full circumstances, and the courts’ 
diverted attention is the problem. The focus on debt collection is a 
departure from the core concerns considered in termination of parental 
rights proceedings, parental fitness and the welfare of the children, 
giving rise to constitutional concerns. 
1. Substantive Due Process 
The Supreme Court has not waivered in its recognition of the 
importance of the parent-child relationship. As Justice Ginsberg 
explained, the Court has been “unanimously of the view that ‘the interest 
of parents in their relationship with their children is sufficiently 
fundamental to come within the finite class of liberty interests protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’” and “that ‘[f]ew consequences of 
judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family ties.’”208 
While consistently recognizing the relationship as constitutionally 
protected, the Court has struggled with the level of constitutional 
protections afforded.  
In 1972, the Court in Stanley v. Illinois struck down as 
unconstitutional a state statute that considered unmarried fathers to be 
presumptively unsuitable parents.209 The Court explained that children 
must not be removed in dependency proceedings without a hearing on 
parental unfitness considering individualized proof.210 Nine years later, in 
Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 
the Court limited the constitutional protections necessary.211 Although 
still recognizing the constitutionally protected status of the parent-child 
relationship, the Court concluded that due process did not always require 
that an indigent parent be appointed counsel in a termination of parental 
rights proceeding.212 Justice Blackmun’s dissent notes the Court’s 
inconsistency:  
  
  The determination of whether the father can overcome the presumption against his 
right to object is significant, because if he is not deemed a “consent father,” his parental rights can be 
effectively terminated without actually proceeding through the more detailed requirements and 
protections under section 384 of the Social Services Law (New York’s termination of parental rights 
statute). If the father is able to establish his right to object, the adequacy of the payment of child 
support obligations may still be a considered but is not listed as a sole factor allowing termination 
under the termination of parental rights statute. E.g., In re Isaiah F., 871 N.Y.S.2d 387 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008), leave to appeal denied, 902 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 2009). 
 208 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119 (1996) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
745, 774, 787 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
 209 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).  
 210 Id.  
 211 Lasiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
 212 Id. 
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Finally, I deem it not a little ironic that the Court on this very day grants, on 
due process grounds, an indigent putative father’s claim for state-paid blood 
grouping tests in the interest of according him a meaningful opportunity to 
disprove his paternity, [citing Little v. Streater], but in the present case rejects, 
on due process grounds, an indigent mother’s claim for state-paid legal 
assistance when the State seeks to take her own child away from her in a 
termination proceeding.213  
The very next year in 1982, Justice Blackmun wrote the majority 
opinion in Santosky v. Kramer, holding that before a state may terminate 
parental rights, the state must prove its allegations by at least clear and 
convincing evidence.214 The pendulum continued to swing, and the year 
after Santosky was decided the Court concluded in Lehr v. Robertson that 
the failure to provide notice to a putative father of pending adoption 
proceedings did not deny him due process.215 Then, in 1996, the Court 
held in M.L.B. v. S.L.J. that a state statute requiring an indigent mother to 
pay transcript costs in order to appeal a termination of parental rights 
determination violated the equal protection and due process clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.216  
Where the termination of parental rights for government-owed 
child support may fall under the Supreme Court’s pendulum has not been 
considered, but such consideration is due. The example statute in North 
Carolina allows for the termination of parental rights based upon any one 
of several grounds, including if “the parent, for a continuous period of 
six months . . . has willfully failed for such period to pay a reasonable 
portion of the cost of care for the juvenile although physically and 
financially able to do so.”217 The statute requires that the evidence of such 
grounds be proved by clear and convincing evidence,218 as required by 
the Supreme Court in Santosky.219 However, the presence of clear and 
convincing evidence of state grounds for terminating parental rights does 
not end the analysis because constitutional protections also demand 
inquiry into the content of the grounds to be proved.220  
Although the Supreme Court in Stanley seemingly laid out a 
constitutional requirement for a parental unfitness determination prior to 
terminating parental rights,221 lower courts continue to disagree. Several 
  
 213 Id. at 58. 
 214 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  
 215 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
 216 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). 
 217 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (2009).  
 218 Id.  
 219 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 746.  
 220 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (noting that the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees not only fair process, but also has a substantive component); 
M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 119 (noting that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental right protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 221 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); see also MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 63-65 (2005) (concluding the Stanley decision established a 
constitutional requirement to determine parental unfitness prior to termination of parental rights).  
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state court decisions support the conclusion that parental unfitness is a 
requisite finding,222 while some courts have refused to require such a 
determination.223 The disagreement in the courts echoes a tension 
between children’s rights, parents’ rights, and the interests of the state, 
and the tension is unlikely to be resolved.224 This is the very nature of the 
laws regarding children, which require the exercise of discretion to 
weigh and balance various interests and concerns, and which are 
sometimes aligned and sometimes competing, depending on the 
individualized circumstances of the case. But whether the requisite 
standard for terminating parental rights is parental unfitness, the best 
interests of children, or some blended variation of the two, all should 
agree that the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental liberty 
interest in the parent-child relationship that requires meaningful inquiry 
into the substantive content of state statutes providing for the permanent 
severing of the relationship.225  
The point is simple: substantive due process, by definition, is 
about more than process.226 As the Supreme Court explained in Troxel v. 
Granville: 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” We have long recognized 
that the Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment 
counterpart, “guarantees more than fair process.” . . . The Clause also includes 
a substantive component that “provides heightened protection against 
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty 
interests.”227  
  
 222 See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Ann S., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 709, 719 (2006) (explaining 
that the “state cannot terminate a parental relationship based solely upon the best interests’ of the 
child without some showing of parental unfitness” (quoting In re Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 
904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992))) (footnote omitted), petition for review granted and opinion superseded 
sub nom. In re Ann Marie S., 141 P.3d 133 (Cal. 2006), aff’d sub nom. In re Guardianship of Ann S., 
202 P.3d 1989 (Cal. 2009); In re Termination of Parental Rights to Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d 845, 857 
(Wis. 2006) (explaining that “[t]he United States Supreme Court has recognized a parent’s 
fundamental right to the care and custody of his or her child, and concluded that a state may not 
terminate this right without an individualized determination that the parent is unfit”).  
 223 See, e.g., Matter of Adoption of J.W.M., 532 N.W.2d 372, 378 (N.D. 1995), overruled 
on other grounds by In re Adoption of S.R.F., 683 N.W.2d 913 (N.D. 2004) (In supporting its 
holding that due process does not require that parental rights can only be terminated on the ground of 
parental unfitness, the court explained that Santosky requires clear and convincing evidence but does 
not dictate the content of grounds to be proven.).  
 224 E.g., Woodhouse, supra note 93, at 422 (noting “our inability to strike a proper 
balance between a triad of conflicting rights and interests—those of parents, children and the state”). 
 225 See infra notes 226-227 and accompanying text.  
 226 Black’s Law Dictionary defines substantive due process as focusing on fair content 
rather than fair procedures: “The doctrine that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate 
governmental objective.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (8th ed. 2004); see, e.g., In re Detention 
of Willis, 691 N.W.2d 726, 729 (Iowa 2005) (“Under principles of substantive due process, the State 
is prohibited from engaging in arbitrary or wrongful actions regardless of the fairness of the 
procedures used to implement them.”). 
 227 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).  
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Rather than the mere rational basis scrutiny requiring government 
statutes and regulations to be rationally related to legitimate government 
interests,228 substantive due process protections for fundamental rights 
requires more. Justice Scalia described the heightened scrutiny as “a 
substantive component, which forbids the government to infringe certain 
‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state 
interest.”229  
A statute that allows the termination of parental rights due to a 
child support obligation owed to the government fails the test. The state 
interest in termination of parental rights proceedings is clear and 
compelling: protecting the welfare of children.230 However, terminating 
the parent-child relationship because of a government-owed debt is not 
related to the compelling state interest, let alone narrowly tailored. The 
statutory provision in North Carolina has been construed as allowing the 
termination of parental rights for less than $100 owed to the 
government.231 Even if the unpaid amount were much greater, severing 
the parent-child relationship as result of the government’s self-interested 
cost recovery collections is simply not narrowly tailored to serve the 
state interest in protecting the welfare and best interests of the individual 
child.232  Thus, with the required nexus lacking, such a statute should not 
withstand substantive due process scrutiny.   
2. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
In addition to the substantive due process violations, an 
impoverished parent’s loss of a child resulting from the inability to pay a 
government debt raises another consideration—cruelty. The Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution, in addition to forbidding excessive bail 
  
 228 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988) (“Unless a statute 
provokes ‘strict judicial scrutiny’ because it interferes with a ‘fundamental right’ or discriminates 
against a ‘suspect class,’ it will ordinarily survive an equal protection attack so long as the 
challenged classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.”). 
 229 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993). 
 230 See, e.g., In re L.L., 159 P.3d 499, 501 (Wyo. 2007) (describing the tension in 
termination of parental rights proceedings “between the fundamental liberty of familial association 
and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare of children”) (quotation omitted). 
 231 In re T.D.P., 595 S.E.2d 735, 738 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 610 S.E.2d 199 (N.C. 
2005) (per curiam). 
 232 In 2006, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a similar conclusion regarding the 
application of a termination of parental rights statute to an incarcerated mother. See In re 
Termination of Parental Rights to Max G.W., 716 N.W.2d 845, 848, 861 (Wis. 2006) (“We also 
conclude that the circuit court’s finding of parental unfitness was based on an impossible condition 
of return, without consideration of any other relevant facts and circumstances particular to the 
parent . . . contrary to . . . Wis. Stat. § 48.415(2)(a) . . . . We further determine that 48.415(2), as 
applied to Jodie, is not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest, and therefore 
conclude that Jodie’s constitutional right to substantive due process was violated.”).  
1368 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4  
and fines, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”233 
The protections apply to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.234  
Although not explicitly limited, most courts have historically 
applied the Eighth Amendment’s protections only to criminal cases.235 
However, in 1993, the Supreme Court in Austin v. United States helped 
open the Amendment’s door to civil sanctions as well.236 In Austin, the 
Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 
applies to in rem civil forfeiture proceedings.237 The Court explained that 
“‘[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across 
the division between the civil and the criminal law.’”238 “[T]he question 
is not,” the Court continued, “whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, 
but rather whether it is punishment.”239 Thus, even if there is a remedial 
purpose, an intertwined punitive effect can still trigger the Eighth 
Amendment protections:  
We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes 
to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. 
We, however must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to 
punish . . . . [A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a 
remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . . .240  
Because Austin only considered application of the Excessive Fines 
Clause to civil forfeiture decisions, the decision did not directly hold that 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause also applies in civil 
contexts.241 However, the same rejection of the criminal verses civil 
distinction, replaced with an analysis of whether an action is punishment 
regardless of the label, should logically flow to the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause.242  
Applying the Austin analysis, the first question regarding 
termination of parental rights due to state-owed child support is whether 
  
 233 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 234 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 235 Mary Ewing di Zerega, Note, Austin v. United States: An Analysis of the Application 
of the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeitures, 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 127, 127 (1994). 
 236 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). 
 237 Id. at 604. 
 238 Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989)). 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 241 Id.  
 242 See Gregory Y. Porter, Note, Uncivil Punishment: The Supreme Court’s Ongoing 
Struggle with Constitutional Limits on Punitive Civil Sanctions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 517, 543 (1997) 
(“Similarly, Halper and Austin should alter the prevailing view that the Cruel and Unusual Clause is 
limited to criminal proceedings. The inquiry required by Halper and Austin focuses on punishment, 
not on the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions . . . .”); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. 
of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263 n.3 (1989) (“We left open in Ingraham 
the possibility that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might find application in some civil 
cases.”). 
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the action is a form of punishment against the parent or solely 
remedial.243 The likelihood of convincing a court that the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment clause is applicable in this context may not be high. 
Several state courts have already rejected arguments that termination 
proceedings in general result in unconstitutional cruel and unusual 
punishment.244 The decisions quickly and correctly conclude that the 
general intent of the termination statutes is clearly not to punish.245 
However, clearly stated remedial intent does not necessarily remove a 
simultaneous, unstated punitive effect. A thorough analysis has been 
lacking in the decisions of whether a specific statutory grounds for 
termination may bring punitive treatment into the legal framework, 
despite the over-arching remedial purpose. As the Supreme Court in 
Austin explained, “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to 
serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also 
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . . .”246 If 
this is the test, the notion of retributive purpose is present in a statutory 
scheme that considers the failure to repay government costs as a ground 
for terminating parental rights.  
Even if the applicability hurdle is overcome and such a statutory 
ground meets the punishment test, an Eighth Amendment claim must 
also pass the test of whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. The 
specific standard to address this question is unclear and has been 
described as a “Rorschach test,” resulting from the Supreme Court’s 
struggles to apply the constitutional clause in a variety of contexts.247 
  
 243 See also Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 & n.6 (“[T]he question is not, as the United States 
would have it, whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment . . . . For 
this reason, the United States’ reliance on Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez and United States v. Ward 
is misplaced. The question in those cases was whether a nominally civil penalty should be 
reclassified as criminal and the safeguards that attend a criminal prosecution should be required . . . . 
In addressing the separate question whether punishment is being imposed, the Court has not 
employed the tests articulated in Mendoza-Martinez and Ward.”); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (describing the various “tests traditionally applied to determine whether 
an Act of Congress is penal or regulatory in character”). 
 244 See Vance v. Lincoln Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414, 419 (Miss. 1991) 
(“Several states have addressed the question of whether a termination of parental rights amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 245 Id. (“The action brought by the Lincoln County Welfare Department was not brought 
to further punish the appellant, but was a reasonable exercise of this state’s legitimate interest in 
providing for the welfare of these children.”); see also In re Imani J., 817 N.Y.S.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006) (concluding that “respondent’s argument predicated on the Eighth Amendment ignores 
the reality that proceedings . . . are not punitive in nature, but rather are designed to address the 
needs and welfare of children”); In re Marriage of T.H., 626 N.E.2d 403, 410 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) 
(same). 
 246 Austin, 509 U.S. at 610.  
 247 See, e.g., Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 151 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(“The cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, like so much in the Bill of Rights, is a Rorschach test. What the judge sees in it is the 
reflection of his or her own values, values shaped by personal experience and temperament as well 
as by historical reflection, public opinion, and other sources or moral judgment.”); James R. Adolf, 
Final Passage: How New York’s Struggle Supports A Supermajority Requirement for Enactment of 
the Death Penalty, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 503, 515 (1997) (“Federal courts have struggled 
to define the ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ ban of the Constitution, often employing vague and 
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Applied in the civil context of termination of parental rights, the “gross 
disproportionality” test may be the most sensible,248 questioning whether 
the resulting termination of rights is overly disproportionate to the 
grounds considered.249 Nonetheless, regardless of the specific test 
applied, whether the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibits 
termination of parental rights based upon government-owed child 
support is a question that justifies judicial consideration.  
C.  Legal Confusion at the Crossroads 
In addition to the constitutional and federal statutory violations, 
foster care cost recovery policies result in several other legal concerns. 
The questions further illustrate the legal conflicts and confusion resulting 
from the child welfare system’s diverted purpose.250  
1. Is Forced Assignment Legal Assignment? 
An assignment of rights is a legally recognized form of contract 
with three parties: an assignor, assignee, and obligor.251 In the context of 
welfare cost recovery, where custodial parents must assign their child 
support rights to receive welfare assistance, the custodial parent is the 
assignor, the state is the assignee, and the absent parent is the obligor.252 
In foster care cases, the required assignment of child support rights 
occurs differently and the status of the three parties to the assignment 
becomes confused. Neither parent has custody, both parents must assign 
their child support rights, and in involuntary child removals the parents 
are not voluntarily applying for benefits in exchange for the assignment. 
The parents are both the assignors and obligors in the same forced 
transaction.  
  
conflicting tests.”); Hillary J. Massey, Disposing of Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile 
Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2006) (noting that “the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment decision making is not a model of clarity”).  
 248 E.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998) (referring to “the standard 
of gross disproportionality articulated in our Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause precedents”).  
 249 For an analysis of the applicability of the proportionality standard in Eighth 
Amendment cases, see Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme 
Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 107 (1995-1996). 
 250 Other legal questions not discussed in this section also pose significant dilemmas. For 
example, when the state’s interest in cost recovery directly conflicts with the best interests of the 
child, whose interests trump? For a discussion of the legal conflict, see Hatcher, Child Support, 
supra note 11, at 1054-63.  
 251 See Bryan D. Hull, Harmonization of Rules Governing Assignments of Right to 
Payment, 54 SMU L. REV. 473, 478-81 (2001) (explaining the legal framework of assignments).  
 252 Paula Roberts, In the Frying Pan and in the Fire: AFDC Custodial Parents and the 
IV-D System, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1407, 1407-08 (1985) (discussing the assignment process in 
the welfare context).  
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At least in theory, the process of assignment of child support 
rights for welfare applicants is voluntary.253 A trade-off occurs with the 
parent assigning her child support rights in return for the receipt of cash 
welfare benefits. With involuntary foster care placements, there is no 
choice.254 Rather than agreeing to trade child support rights for welfare 
benefits, the transfer of child support rights to the government in foster 
care cases is forced.255 Also, the requisites for a valid contract—an offer, 
acceptance, and consideration—can all be found or at least implied in the 
transaction when a parent applies for welfare and agrees to assign her 
child support rights. With involuntary foster care placements, there is no 
offer or acceptance, and the presence of adequate consideration to 
validate the contract is doubtful. Rather than receiving a positive return 
for the assignment of rights, such as cash assistance, the parent in an 
involuntary foster care placement loses custody of her child.256 Without 
the required elements of a valid contract, an assignment of rights based 
upon contract principles cannot occur.  
The answer to this legal quandary is seemingly that federal law 
requires the assignment of child support rights; therefore, the 
assignments are not based in principles of contract law but simply in 
federal statutory requirement.257  Still, questions remain. The federal law 
requires that “where appropriate, all steps will be taken” by the state to 
“secure an assignment” of the parents’ child support rights.258 With no 
guidance explaining how the assignments are to be secured, many states 
have simply enacted statutes that automatically assign child support 
rights when foster care services are received.259 The notion of statutorily 
  
 253 However, in my prior work as a legal aid lawyer, I encountered many clients who felt 
they had no choice because of the desperate need for cash assistance, and others who indicated that 
they were unaware that their child support rights were assigned to the state at the time they applied 
for welfare benefits. 
 254 States also have procedures to allow voluntary placements, where the parent makes a 
choice to place the child in state custody.  
 255 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17) (2006). 
 256 Parents of foster children do receive services from the child welfare agency after child 
removal. However, this is certainly not the type of bargained for exchange contemplated in contract 
law.  
 257 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 258 Id.  
 259 E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-09-06.1 (2009) (providing that “[a]n application under 
this chapter is deemed to create and effect an assignment of all rights to support, which a family 
member or foster child may have or come to have, to the state agency”). How the “application” in an 
involuntary foster care cases is contemplated is uncertain. However, some states may attempt to 
“secure assignments” without legal authority. For example, although Maryland regulation requires 
the pursuit child support against the parents of foster children and explains the support should be 
used to reimburse government costs of care, MD. CODE REGS. 7.2.11.26(L) (2009), statutory 
authority for the regulatory requirement seems lacking. Statutory authority exists for a court to order 
the parents to reimburse the costs of care, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-819(l) (West 
2009), and to refer the parents for child support enforcement services, id. § 3-822, but not to assign 
the resulting child support to the government. The Maryland child support agency is provided 
statutory authority to enforce assigned child support obligations, but only child support assigned as 
the result of the receipt of cash welfare assistance, not foster care services. Id., FAM. LAW § 10-108; 
id., HUMAN SERVS. § 5-312.  
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created debts requiring parents to reimburse government costs of services 
for their children is not new. States have often required parents to pay for 
the institutionalization of their children through parental responsibility 
statutes that create statutory debts owed by the parents.260 Thus, federal 
law could have required the creation of such statutory parental debts for 
children in foster care without any required assignment of already 
existing child support rights. But by including the assignment 
requirement, Congress sought more than a simple statutory debt.  
The difference does not lie solely in the semantics. Requiring 
assignment of child support rights rather than establishing a regular debt 
evidences the government’s desire to maintain the special status of the 
child support obligation, even when no longer owed to the child. Unlike 
regular debts, the child support obligation benefits from heightened 
enforcement tools, such as the ability to garnish up to 65% of wages, 261 
the threat of incarceration prohibited by state constitutions for other 
debts,262 and the full power and resources of IV-D child support 
enforcement offices.263 To maintain such unique legal status of assigned 
rights in the hands of an assignee, the principles of contractual 
assignment law would seem to be required. 
To add another layer to the consideration, a basic question about 
child support is often overlooked: who possesses the rights to child 
support—the child, the parent, or both? Although few courts have 
considered who owns the rights in a direct dispute between the custodial 
parent and child, many courts indicate that child support rights primarily 
belong to the child.264 If the child either owns or co-owns the rights, the 
  
 260 E.g., 59 A.L.R.3d 636 (liability of parent for support of child institutionalized by 
juvenile court.).  
 261 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2006).  
 262 See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. III, § 38 (West 2006) (“[S]upport of a spouse or dependent 
children, or for the support of an illegitimate child or children, or for alimony . . . shall not constitute 
a debt within the meaning of this section.”).  
 263 Bankruptcy decisions further illustrate the distinction between statutory debts to 
reimburse costs of care and assigned child support rights. The decisions explain that a state’s right to 
reimbursement through a statutory debt is not the equivalent of an assignment of child support for 
purposes of the discharge exception statute, and thus the statutory debts were dischargeable whereas 
assigned child support is not. E.g., County of Oakland v. Fralick, 215 B.R. 132, 134 (W.D. Mich. 
1997); Saafir v. Kansas Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 192 B.R. 964, 969 (D. Neb. 1996). 
 264 E.g., Hall v. Hall-Stradley, 776 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that 
“the beneficial owner of the child support payments is the child, not the custodial parent”); Serio v. 
Serio, 830 So. 2d 278, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“It is well settled that parents may not waive 
their children’s right to support because that right belongs to the children.”); Kibble v. Weeks 
Dredging & Constr. Co., 735 A.2d 1142, 1150 (N.J. 1999) (“That the right to child support belongs 
to the child and not to the custodial parent is a fundamental principle of family law. Accordingly, the 
right to child support ‘cannot be waived by the custodial parent.’” (quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 660 
A.2d 485, 485 (N.J. 1995))) (citations omitted); cf. Bornemann v. Bornemann, 931 A.2d 1154, 1163-
64 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007). The Bornemann court rejected the argument that post-age 18 child 
support payments should be paid directly to a child rather than custodial parent:  
[A]ppellant suggests not only that Adam must be a party, but that the post-age 18 support 
payments should be made directly to Adam, not to his mother. We find no support for 
that proposition. Child support enables the custodial parent to provide the necessaries of 
life for a minor child-food, shelter, clothing, etc. . . . To suggest that child support should 
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logic regarding assignment becomes further muddled.265 The rights of 
mistreated children are assigned by the parents responsible for the 
mistreatment. Absent a valid contractual agreement to assign child 
support rights, and with questions regarding whose rights can be properly 
assigned even were a contractual agreement in place, a takings analysis 
may be warranted.266  
2. Misguided Guidelines  
Courts initially possessed wide discretion in setting child support 
amounts by simply considering children’s needs and their parents’ 
financial circumstances.267 The case-by-case approach resulted in widely 
varying support awards and was often criticized.268 In 1984, Congress 
responded to the concerns and enacted legislation requiring each state to 
establish guidelines for determining child support awards.269 The 
guidelines then became binding with the enactment of the Family 
Support Act of 1988, which mandated states to make application of the 
required guidelines a “rebuttable presumption.”270 
Responding to the mandate, states established a variety of 
approaches to structuring the child support guidelines,271 but all of the 
  
be paid directly to a child, even assuming adulthood, where his necessaries are being 
provided by a custodial parent, flies in the face of logic and the stated public policy of 
providing for minor children. . . . Unless it can be shown that a child, during the period 
between his or her 18th birthday and one of the other statutory terminating conditions, is 
responsible for his or her own necessaries, post age 18 child support payments . . . must 
be made to the child’s custodial parent or guardian, not to the child. 
Id. 
 265 Moreover, once the assignment is imposed upon the child, the corresponding 
obligation is often court ordered in the name of one of the parents against the other for payments that 
are owed by both of the parents to the government. New cases are initiated in the name of one of the 
parents, or existing orders are simply continued without change, but the payments are routed to the 
state as the real party in interest without the state being named in the order. Over thirty years ago, a 
family court in New York noticed the nonsensicalness and concluded a state agency could not 
litigate a child support obligation in the name of a parent when the state is the real party in interest. 
Chauvaux v. Chauvaux, 371 N.Y.S.2d 989 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975). 
 266 For such a takings analysis regarding the practice of foster care agencies taking 
children’s Social Security benefits to reimburse costs, see Hatcher, Foster Children, supra note 12, 
at 1838.  
 267 Ira Mark Ellman & Tara O’Toole Ellman, The Theory of Child Support, 45 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 107, 110-11 (2008) (citing LAURA W. MORGAN, CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION § 1.01 (1996)).  
 268 Id.; Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan & Judith Wallerstein, Visitation and Child 
Support Guidelines: A Comment on Fabricius and Braver, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 342, 346 (2004) (“In 
the 1970s, child support awards in nearly all states were determined on a case-by-case basis by a 
judge in a judicial hearing. This system led to grave inequities and dissatisfaction, in large part 
because people in identical circumstances were treated very differently.”). 
 269 Garfinkel et al., supra note 268, at 346. 
 270 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 103(a), (b), 102 Stat. 2346 
(1988); Garfinkel et al., supra note 268, at 346. 
 271 See Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of 
Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 60-62 (1998) (describing the various child support 
guidelines models).  
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approaches followed a basic assumption: the guidelines consider the 
circumstances of two parties, the noncustodial parent and the custodial 
parent, and the result is a child support award that is payable to the 
custodial parent. The guidelines generally do not contemplate the 
circumstances of assigned support in foster care cases where there are 
two noncustodial parents who owe support to the state.272  
States typically ignore this poor fit and apply the same child 
support guidelines to establish child support obligations against the 
parents of foster children as in all other child support cases.273 Although a 
simple solution, complexities result. Federal law dictates that state 
guidelines must be presumptively correct.274 However, the law also 
directs that courts have discretion to deviate from the guidelines when 
their application would be “unjust or inappropriate.”275 Federal regulation 
then clarifies that the “unjust or inappropriate” determination “must take 
into consideration the best interests of the child.”276   
Applying this framework to foster care cases creates a 
paradoxical scenario. Because the child support is owed to the 
government, the children generally receive no benefit from payments.277 
In many cases, reunification with the parents may be in the best interests 
of the child but the pursuit of assigned child support conflicts with the 
  
 272 In re Joshua W., 617 A.2d 1154, 1159 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). The court details 
the dilemma of how the guidelines do not fit the circumstances of foster care cases:  
[T]he Income Shares Model does not seem to address situations where the child is placed 
in foster care with neither parent having physical custody of the child. Other models of 
calculating child support also focus on the typical child support situation with one 
custodial parent. For example, the Wisconsin Percentage of Income Standard “assumes 
that each parent will expend the designated proportion of income on the child, with the 
custodial parent’s proportion spent directly.” . . . Only the Delaware Melson Formula 
seems to lend itself to situations in which there are two noncustodial parents. This model 
is premised on allowing parents to retain sufficient income for their most basic needs… 
Like the other models, however, the Delaware model eventually returns to a discussion of 
custodial and noncustodial parents and how the child’s support needs are allocated 
between them. The language of the child support guidelines similarly does not directly 
address the situation involved here. The guidelines discuss dividing the basic child 
support obligation and other expenses between the parents with the “noncustodial” parent 
owing the support obligation to the “custodial” parent. Furthermore, the guidelines refer 
only to cases of sole custody and shared physical custody. 
Id. 
 273 Id. (holding that the guidelines should be used for foster care cases); see also Dutchess 
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Day v. Day, 749 N.E.2d 733 (N.Y. 2001) (same). 
 274 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2000). 
 275 Id. (“There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative 
proceeding for the award of child support, that the amount of the award . . . is the correct amount of 
child support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the application 
of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, as determined under criteria 
established by the State, shall be sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case.”). 
 276 Guidelines for Setting Child Support Awards, 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(g) (2006).  
 277 Although assigned child support is owed to the government, the government may only 
keep the amount of child support that does not exceed the amount of government assistance 
provided. 42 U.S.C. § 657(a)(1) (2000).  
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reunification goal.278 Further, even if reunification is not possible, 
collecting government-owed child support may still harm the child’s 
interests. Without the government debt obligation, parents may be more 
likely to provide other informal support to the child while in foster care279 
and direct child support payments to the child after leaving care.280  
Thus, the federally required consideration of the best interests of 
the children in decisions whether to deviate downward from the child 
support guidelines should mandate that most, if not all, foster care cases 
receive a downward departure. If best interests of the children are the 
true guide, the resulting order amounts should be set at zero.  
3. Cost Recovery in State-Funded Foster Care 
If the validity of the legal process of pursuing assigned child 
support in IV-E foster care cases is unclear, the process of seeking child 
support to reimburse government costs in state-funded foster care is even 
more in doubt. As explained in the Part I.B.4, federal law only requires 
states to pursue child support obligations to reimburse foster care costs in 
cases where the child is eligible to receive IV-E federal foster care 
assistance.281 There is no federal law that requires the assignment of child 
support in state-funded foster care cases or that allows the use of the IV-
D child support system to enforce such obligations. Rather, the only 
framework for the cost recovery process in these non-IV-E foster care 
cases is a series of informal federal communications.  
Most recently, a 2007 Information Memorandum from the HHS 
Administration of Children and Families included limited guidance for 
cost recovery in state-funded foster care cases.282 The communication 
first explained that  
[w]hile section 471(a)(17) of the Social Security Act grants title IV-E agencies 
authority “to secure an assignment to the State of any rights to support on 
behalf of each child receiving foster care maintenance payments[,”] this 
authority cannot be exercised on behalf of children who are not receiving title 
IV-E payments.283  
“However,” the guidance continued, “a different process may be pursued 
according to existing OCSE [Office of Child Support Enforcement] 
policy” for seeking child support in the state-funded foster care.284 The 
guidance cites to a Program Instruction and Action Transmittal issued a 
  
 278 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
 279 See Hatcher, Child Support, supra note 11, at 1069.  
 280 Because of the likelihood of arrearages still owed, assigned child support is often still 
pursued after a child leaves foster care, thus reducing the ability of a parent to pay current child 
support directly to the child.  
 281 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17). 
 282 See ACF INFO. MEMO., supra note 28. 
 283 Id. (quoting Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(17)).  
 284 Id.  
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few months earlier,285 which explained state discretion to seek 
assignments of child support for non-TANF funded assistance.286 “[A] 
State would have to take an assignment in accordance with its own 
statutory authority,” the transmittal explained, and could then utilize the 
federally funded IV-D child support program to enforce the assigned 
child support obligation.287   
The lack of statutory or regulatory authority for this informal 
process raises Administrative Procedures Act (APA) concerns.288 Further, 
even if the network of non-regulatory communications can survive APA 
scrutiny, the process contains unworkable logistics. The federal child 
support distribution rules only allow child support to be paid to the 
government when assigned pursuant to federal law.289 In state-funded 
foster care cases, the assignments occur solely by state process.290 Thus, 
even if the assignments are valid under state law, the federal distribution 
rules governing the IV-D child support program prohibits the distribution 
of any collected payments to the state government.291   
Apparently recognizing the dilemma, but again with no statutory 
or regulatory authority, the federal agency cites to multiple prior Policy 
Interpretation Questions (PIQ’s) as authority for explaining that custodial 
parents are free to request that child support payments distributed to the 
parents be re-routed to a different entity.292 Thus, the guidance explained 
that to bypass the federal distribution rules, all that states need to do is 
require the parents to sign agreements redirecting payments distributed 
  
 285 Id. at pt. IV (citing ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM INSTRUCTION & ACTION TRANSMITTAL, TANF-ACF-PI-2007-02, 
OCSE-AT-2007-02 (2007) [hereinafter PROGRAM INSTRUCTION & ACTION TRANSMITTAL], 
available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/AT/2007/at-07-02a.PDF). 
 286 PROGRAM INSTRUCTION & ACTION TRANSMITTAL, supra note 285, at 4. Apparently, 
the policy is also intended by the guidance to apply to state discretion to seek assignments of child 
support for non-IV-E foster care. 
 287 Id.  
 288 The Administrative Procedure Act generally requires that for an agency rule to be 
binding, notice of proposed rulemaking must be published in the Federal Register, and interested 
persons must be allowed the opportunity to provide comments for agency consideration. 5 U.S.C. § 
553(b)-(c) (2006). However, exemptions from the notice and comment requirements may be 
available where an agency communication is not substantive but rather only interpretive or a policy 
statement. Id. Determining whether an agency communication is merely interpretive or a policy 
statement rather than substantive is often difficult. See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules 
Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1708-09 (2007) (“[T]he distinction between rules that must be 
promulgated via notice and comment rulemaking and those that need not has been called ‘fuzzy,’ 
‘tenuous,’ ‘baffling,’ ‘blurred,’ and ‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’ As one prominent professor 
has noted, ‘[t]he subject of nonlegislative rules breeds bewilderment and frustration.’” (quoting 
Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: Lifting the 
Smog, 8 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 1, 6 (1994))). See generally William Funk, When is a “Rule” a 
Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 659 (2002).  
 289 See 42 U.S.C. § 657 (2000) (only allows distribution of child support payments to the 
state or federal government up to the amount of “assistance” received by the family, with 
“assistance” defined as only TANF or IV-E benefits).  
 290 PROGRAM INSTRUCTION & ACTION TRANSMITTAL, supra note 285, at 4.  
 291 Id. at 6. 
 292 Id.  
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from the state agency to the parents back to the state again.293 Or as the 
guidance also provided, a state may “direct the IV-D program to send 
support collections, distributed to [the child] under [the federal 
distribution requirements] but assigned to the State under State law, to 
the [state agency].”294  
Setting aside the circularity of the attempted end-run around the 
federal distribution rules, were a parent voluntarily applying for state-
funded services as in voluntary foster care placements, such a 
requirement at least makes some logistical sense. However, in 
circumstances where a child is involuntarily removed, the parents are not 
actively seeking or applying for foster care services. If the parent simply 
refuses to sign such agreement to re-route the distributed child support 
payments back over to the state government, the only apparent recourse 
would be to deny foster care services and return the child to the parent 
who opposed removal in the first place.  
Thus, in addition to unconstitutional practices and conflicts with 
federal law, child welfare agency efforts to recover foster care costs 
through child support enforcement result in several unresolved legal 
questions. Recommendations to address the legal concerns and questions, 
as well as the policy implications discussed in Part II, are set out below 
in Part IV. 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
A collaboration of the child welfare and child support programs 
should help—not harm—the beneficiaries of the agencies’ core missions. 
The federally required cost recovery effort inserts a self-interested fiscal 
pursuit that subverts the agencies’ purposes of serving the interests of 
children and their parents. The diversion is not subtle in its effect. Foster 
care cost recovery through child support enforcement harms the best 
interests of children, undermines family reunification efforts, is fiscally 
unsound, and results in both illegality and legal confusion. 
The cost recovery requirements should be eliminated, along with 
the required assignment of child support rights, so that when child 
support is pursued the payments will be directed to benefit the 
children.295 Still, caution will be necessary to ensure the decision to 
initiate child support only occurs when not in conflict with case-planning 
goals and after all the parties’ interests have been properly considered. 
For example, if a child has been temporarily placed in foster care with a 
plan of reunification with the mother, the mother might decide, in 
consultation with her caseworker, that seeking child support from the 
  
 293 Id.  
 294 Id.  
 295 In addition to the elimination of the assignment requirement, child support distribution 
rules would also need to be clarified so that receipt of IV-E benefits no longer triggers distribution of 
child support payments to the government.  
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absent father could provide a needed resource available to her and the 
child after the reunification occurs. However, if the case-plan is to 
encourage possible reunification with either the mother or the father, 
pursuing child support will likely be ill advised.296 If reunification is no 
longer an option with either parent, a choice could be made to pursue 
child support if in the child’s best interests. The child support could be 
used to improve the child’s care by directing the payments to increase the 
inadequate financial assistance provided to the child’s foster parents.297 
Or, the payments could be conserved in trust to assist the child with the 
difficult transition to independence after aging out of foster care.298  
The elimination of foster care cost recovery through child 
support enforcement, while necessary to bring child support policy in 
line with the child welfare system’s primary missions, will be politically 
difficult. The cost recovery focus has long been entrenched in the fiscal 
mindset of Congress and the states. Thus, short of the complete 
elimination of the policy, several reforms are still possible to begin the 
needed realignment.   
Federal law already provides significant discretion in whether to 
“secure an assignment” of child support rights in order to reimburse 
government costs.299 Unfortunately, the discretion is not mandatory and is 
often not used. Congress should thus amend the federal statute to require 
states to exercise discretion and only refer foster care cases for child 
support enforcement if not contrary to the children’s best interests or in 
conflict with case-planning goals. If reunification is a possibility, a child 
support referral should not occur. Further, federal law should also rectify 
current illegal practices by prohibiting the insertion of government-owed 
child support into required case plans, and by clarifying that the assigned 
child support may not be grounds for terminating parental rights.  
If Congress does not act, states should. In addition to ensuring 
that state practices do not include the cost recovery debt in reunification 
plans or in termination of parental rights procedures, states should 
implement available discretion regarding child support referrals. 
  
 296 If child support is initiated against only one of the parents then the obligation could 
unfairly tilt the likelihood of reunification toward one parent over the other. And cross-child support 
obligations against both parents could reduce the chances of reunification with either parent. It is 
possible however, that in some circumstances where the parents both have the ability to pay a small 
support amount, the payments could be pursued and conserved as a resource made available to 
whichever parent later achieves reunification.  
 297 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principles, 4 J.L. & FAM. 
STUD. 151, 162 (2002) (“Foster care payments are dismally low and cannot cover the real costs of 
child rearing.”). 
 298 See generally Michele Benedetto, An Ounce of Prevention: A Foster Youth’s 
Substantive Due Process Right to Proper Preparation for Emancipation, 9 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & 
POL’Y 381, 387 (2005) (discussing the many difficulties foster children face after aging out of care); 
Katherine M. Swift, A Child’s Right: What Should the State be Required to Provide to Teenagers 
Aging Out of Foster Care?, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1205, 1207 (2006) (same); Melinda 
Atkinson, Note, Aging Out of Foster Care: Towards a Universal Safety Net for Former Foster Care 
Youth, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 187-95 (2008) (same).  
 299 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(17) (2000). 
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California provides a possible model, requiring that local child welfare 
offices “shall determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to 
have the case referred to the local child support agency for child support 
services.”300 The state law only allows the referral for child support 
enforcement “[i]f reunification services are not offered or are 
terminated.”301 Moreover, in addition to such required considerations in 
California, individuals contesting child support referrals should be 
provided the opportunity to be heard and the right to appeal.  
Finally, if child support obligations are initiated in foster care 
cases, states should take full advantage of recent amendments in the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.302 The Act provides improved state 
options to reduce the negative effect of child support assignment 
requirements, including an incentive to “pass through” assigned child 
support back to children and their families.303 Although the “pass 
through” option is primarily promoted as a benefit to custodial parents 
receiving cash welfare assistance under the TANF program,304 states may 
also be able to use the option to benefit children in foster care.305  
The reforms suggested here are necessary to address the policy 
concerns and illegal practices that currently lie at the intersection of 
foster care and child support. Reunification goals should not be 
undermined, case-plans intended to help families should not be converted 
  
 300 CAL. FAM. CODE § 17552 (2006). 
 301 Id.; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.361 (2007) (requiring the consideration of 
several factors prior to initiating a child support obligation in foster care cases, including: “(1) The 
ability of the parents to pay for the care, support, maintenance, and education of the child; (2) The 
chances for reunification of the parents and child; (3) Whether issuing the order will encourage the 
reunification of the parents and child or undermine that reunification”). 
 302 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 303 In addition to the new “pass through” option, including federal participation in the 
passed through amounts, a new option is also available that allows states to distribute federal tax 
refund intercepts to families first when back child support arrearages are both owed to the 
government and the family. Id., 120 Stat. at 141-42.  
 304 Publications addressing state implementation of the DRA child support options discuss 
the benefits in TANF cases but do not mention foster care cases. See, e.g., CTR. ON BUDGET & 
POLICY PRIORITIES & CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, IMPLEMENTING THE TANF CHANGES IN THE 
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT: “WIN-WIN” SOLUTIONS FOR FAMILIES AND STATES 7-14 (2006), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-9-06tanf.pdf; Vicki Turetsky, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, 
CHILD SUPPORT PROVISIONS IN THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT (2007), available at 
http://clasp.org/publications/dra_cs_csda_91907.pdf. However, language in the federal statute 
allowing the pass through of assigned child support, 42 U.S.C. § 657, is available for families 
currently or formerly receiving “assistance,” defined as including both TANF and also IV-E foster 
care assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 657(c)(1). Thus, states should be able to take advantage of current pass 
through options in foster care cases without need for federal statutory amendment.  
 305 Rather than keeping the assigned child support to reimburse government costs, at least 
a portion of the payments could be given back to the children to serve their individual needs while in 
foster care or to save for the future transition to independence. For a former state child support 
agency leader’s plea to use child support in foster care cases to benefit the children, see Hearing on 
Federal Foster Care Financing Before the Subcomm. on Income Security and Family Support of the 
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Frank Richards, former Deputy 
Associate Commissioner of Child Support Enforcement Services in New York City), available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3162. 
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into debt collection tools, and parents should not lose their children for 
money owed to the government. And if child support is pursued, the 
children should benefit. Promise lies in a strengthened partnership 
between child welfare and child support agencies, but only if the agency 
missions are preserved.  
